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I. Western Legal Tradition
The theory and practice of criminal law in common law and civil
law jurisdictions have been traditionally viewed by scholars as
distinctive and fairly diverse.1 Each belongs to a tradition that has been
regarded as quite different from each other.2 However, in several areas,
common law and civil law have been increasingly moving toward
convergence . The purpose of this article is to show that the prevailing
theories of offense in these two legal systems constitute an area of
convergence between civil law and common law. Underlying this
premise is the conception that, despite the view of the majority of
authors, common law, especially as applied in the United States, and
civil law should be considered as one legal tradition- the so-called
* Assistant Professor, Dalhousie University; Postdoctoral Fellow, University of
Ottawa (2001-2002), Doctor of Civil Law (McGill University). I would like to
thank the University of California, Davis School of Law, particularly Beth
Greenwood, where research for this article took place.
1 See generally H. Patrick Glenn, Are Legal Traditions Incommensurable? 49
AM. J. CoMP. L. 133 (2001) (examining the idea that distinct legal traditions can
be compared using their diverse characteristics); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE
CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN
EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (2d ed. 1985).
2 Julio C. Cueto Rua, The Future of the Civil Law, 37 LA. L. REV. 645, 645
(1977).
3 See JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT
DOCTRINE 1 (1991).
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
western legal tradition.4 The similarities between civil law and U.S.
common law, compared to other legal traditions, outweigh their
differences. 5 Even in those areas where there are still striking differences,
both systems are slowly moving toward convergence. 
6
This article starts by examining the evolving convergence of
civil law and common law. It briefly addresses the history of the
theoretical and philosophical perspectives that contributed to evolution
and change within these two systems. Then, the article analyzes general
features of the central aspects of criminal law theory in the civil law
(Goal-oriented theory) and common law jurisdictions. Finally, this
article briefly focuses on the analysis of crimes against life, highlighting
the common features of their treatment in civil law and common law
criminal law theory. This work intends to pave the way for future
research on other areas where civil law and common law also present a
certain high degree of uniformity.
7
II. Convergence
Comparative law has long been concerned with the convergence
phenomenon among legal traditions.8  Convergence constitutes the
evolution of legal institutions within different legal systems where the
institution of one system resembles the other; and, the legal norms,
principles, and scholarly comments of both are used in equal measure,
"even regarded as authoritative as each other." 9 Unlike harmonization,
which implies "a [deliberate] and negotiated process" aimed at producing
a legislative or other conventional act, convergence constitutes a natural
4 See RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE
WORLD TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 25
(3d ed.1985).
5 See Ren6 David, Existe-t-il un Droit Occidental? in XXTH CENTURY
COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 56-64 (Kurt H. Nadelmann et. al ed.,
1961).
6 See GORDLEY, supra note 3, at 1.
7 See EDMUNDO S. HENDLER, DERECHO PENAL Y PROCESAL PENAL DE LOS
ESTADOS UNIDOS 36 (1996).
8 See, e.g., Louis F. Del Duca, An Historic Convergence of Civil Law and
Common Law Systems-Italy's New "Adversarial" Criminal Procedure System,
10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 73 (1991) (examining the transplant of aspects of the U.S.
adversarial system into the Italian Criminal Procedure Code).
9 Peter de Cruz, A MODERN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 34 (1993).
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(unconscious) "common development" of legal institutions "through
mutual interest."' 0 Natural convergence is the result of a "tendency [in
similar nations] ... to have similar problems and to arrive at similar legal
ways of perceiving and dealing with them."" Convergence is not an
isolated instance, but rather the natural route that civil law and common
law have been taking.'
2
Convergence between areas of common law and civil law is not
new. 13 It traces its roots to the Enlightenment and has been a slow and
gradual process. 14 In England, the innovative thinking in the Inns of
Court in the period between 1490 A.D. and 1540 A.D. planted the first
seeds of the process of integration between common law and civil law.
Inspired by Roman law concepts, Lord Mansfield, Blackstone, and other
comparative scholars produced seminal works that also prompted the
gradual development of convergence.' 5 As emphasized by Glenn, "[b]y
the nineteenth century English thought had developed a large measure of
compatibility with that of the continent,"' 16 which was later reinforced
with the advent of the European integration.'
7
In the United States, this process has been more remarkable and
radical.' 8 Glenn suggests that "US law represents a deliberate rejection
1o Carol Harlow, Voices of Difference in a Plural Community, 50 AM. J. COMP.
L. 339, 341-42 (2002).
11 John Henry Merryman, On the Convergence (and the Divergence) of the Civil
Law and the Common Law, 17 STAN. J. INT. L. 357, 369 (1981).
12 See David Stevens and Jason W. Neyers, What's Wrong with Restitution?, 37
ALTA. L. REv. 221,, 227-28 (1999).
3 Kai Schadbach, The Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental European
View, 16 B.U. INT'L L.J. 331, 341-43 (1998).
14 See H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE
DIVERSITY IN LAW 226 (2000).
's Schadbach, supra note 13, at 342.
16 GLENN, supra note 14, at 226.
17 See ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR & RICHARD F. SCOTT, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION: A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: MATERIALS AND CASES 1 (2001).
18 Raj Bhala writes:
An interesting dimension of the convergence between
common and civil law systems is the apparently increasingly
common practice of American appellate courts to publish slip
opinions with a warning that the opinions are not to be cited.
This behavior, viewed systemically, might represent a retreat
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of common law principle, with preference being given to more
affirmative ideas clearly derived from civil law."' 9  While this
affirmation may seem rather extreme, the United States was undoubtedly
greatly influenced by civil law sources in the nineteenth century,
especially by German scholars, whose influence molded the shape of
U.S. common law.20 As Glenn notes, "[t]his was evident in substantive
law, [especially] in the reception of the ideas of rights," virtually
unknown at the time in the United Kingdom, but even more evident in
terms of structures and sources of law.2 ' Civil law has also influenced
legislation in the United States. 22 Apart from the obvious adoption of
codes, courts often interpret legislation by resorting to civilian
methodologies under a civil law philosophy.23
At the same time, common law ideas, styles, and conceptions
have greatly influenced civil law. As Tetley notes, "[c]ivil law
jurisdictions often have a statute law that is heavily influenced by the
common law."24 Entire legal areas, such as the regulation of securities,
commercial papers,26 and even constitutional law,27  have been
extrapolated from the United States to several civil law countries around
the world. Additionally, a mosaic of common law institutions- such as
from stare decisis, and perhaps even a movement toward
continental-style adjudication.
The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of A
Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 845, 914 n.214 (1999).
19 GLENN, supra note 14, at 230.
20 More recent German scholars, such as Kessler and Prausnitz, played an
important role in the development of U.S. contract law. Siegelman v. Cunard
White Star, Ltd., F.2d 189, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1955).
21 GLENN, supra note 14, at 230.
22 Jerome Frank, Civil Law Influences on the Common Law- Some Reflections on
"Comparative" and "Contrastive" Law, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 887, 922 (1956)
23 Idat 23; Harlan. F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv.
L. REV. 13-14 (1936).
24 William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions. Common law v. Civil law (Codified and
Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677, 687 (2000).
25 See, eg., On Securities and Stock Exchanges, No. 1512-XII (March 12, 1992)
(Belr.).
26 See, e.g., On Financial Papers, Res. 701 (November 13, 1991) (Kaz.).
27 See Jonathan M. Miller, The Authority of a Foreign Talisman: A Study of US.
Constitutional Practice as Authority in Nineteenth Century Argentina and the
Argentine Elite's Leap of Faith, 46 AM. U.L. REV. 1483, 1484 (1997).
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probation as an alternative to punishment for criminal conduct,2s cram
down procedures for the approval of bankruptcy plans,2 9 class actions for
collective litigation,3° and transfer pricing for the taxation of related
companies" have been introduced in civil law countries directly from the
United States. Furthermore, the United States also greatly influenced the
structure and organization of the legal profession; and, more and more
countries now have a bar that looks like the U.S. model. This is
especially notable among lawyers practicing international business law in
Western Europe and major Latin American countries.32
Aside from the criminal law theory of offense analyzed below,
common law and civil law have been moving toward convergence in
several other areas, particularly in the commercial and contractual
realms.33 For example, contract law in both civil law and common law
shares a common history34; and, some aspects of contract formation are
remarkably similar in both jurisdictions.35 Thus, contract law in Anglo-
28 See National Probation Service Act of Latvia (Valsts Probacijas dienesta
likums) (2003) (Lat.), available at
http://www.mk.gov.lv/index.php/files/2/29012.doc and
http://www.probacija.lv/site/gen/3 (last accessed November 14, 2004).
29 See 1 FRANCISCO QUINTANA FERREYRA, CONCURSOS: LEY 19.551 Y
MODIFICATORIAS: COMENTADA, ANOTADA Y CONCORDADA 551-559 (1988) (art.
48 of the Argentine Bankruptcy Act, no. 19.551 (1984)).
30 See Ada Pellegrini Grinover, Da "class action for damages" t aqdo de classe
brasileira: os requisitos de admissibilidade, REVISTA IBEROAMERICANA DE
DERECHO PROCESAL, Afto I, N* 2, 126 (2002).
31 See JUAN MARTIN JOVANOVICH, CUSTOMS VALUATION AND TRANSFER
PRICING: IS IT POSSIBLE TO HARMONIZE CUSTOMS AND TAX RULES? 1 (2002);
VICTOR UCKMAR, IMPUESTOS SOBRE EL COMERCIO INTERNACIONAL 1 (2003).
32 See Octavio R. Acedo Quezada, Nuevos Retos y Desafios de una Profesion
Juridica, 39 REVISTA VINCULO JURIDICO 3 (1999), available at
http://www.ciu.reduaz.mx/vinculo/webrvj/rev39-2.htm (last accessed November
14, 2004).
33 See Kalvis Torgans & Amy Bushaw, Some Comparative Aspects of Contract
Law in Civil and Common Law Systems, 12 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 37, 47, 72
(2002).
34 GORDLEY, supra note 3 at 1.
35 Compare CODIGO CIVIL DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA [C6D. CIV.] art. 1150
(Arg.), with RESTATATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50 (1981).
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American states traces its origins to primitive Roman law concepts.36 The
forefathers of contract law-Comyn, 37 Chitty,38 Story,39 among others-
"systematize[d]" the doctrine of contracts in common law,40 based on the
works of French scholars
41 such as Jean Domat4
2 and Robert Pothier,4
3
who directly influenced the French Civil Code of 1804. These also
influenced other natural law jurists, such as Hugo Grotius44 and
Pufendorf,45 who in turn had been influenced by the Spanish school of
natural law, also known as the late scholastics. 46 As Gordley clearly
delineated, common law lawyers illustrated these civil law doctrines with
English cases47 which the courts certainly did not have in mind when
36 ATILIO ANIBAL ALTERINI, CONTRATOS: CIVILES, COMERCIALES, DE
CONSUMO. TEORiA GENERAL 15 (1999). See also W.W. BUCKLAND & ARNOLD
D. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW & COMMON LAW: A COMPARISON IN OUTLINE 195
(2d ed. 1952).
37 1 SAMUEL COMYN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO CONTRACTS AND
AGREEMENTS NOT UNDER SEAL: WITH CASES AND DECISIONS THEREON IN THE
ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT (Riley 1809).
38 JOSEPH CHITrY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(Garland 1978) (1826).
39 WILLIAM W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS NOT UNDER
SEAL (1847).
40 James Gordley, The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some Unfinished
Business, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1815, 1847 (2000).
41 See GORDLEY, supra note 3, at 4. Natural law influence can be seen, inter
alia, in the idea of consent and agreement embedded in the notion of contracts.
42 JEAN DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER (William Strahan
trans., 1722).
43 ROBERT J. POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS (William D.
Evans trans., 1826). Pothier's contract law was characterized as "law at
Westminster as well as Orleans." WILLIAM JONES, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF
BAILMENTS 29 (Garland 1978) (1781).
44 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LBRI TRES (Francis W. Kelsey
trans., 1925).
45 SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM, LIBRI OCTO
(1672).
46 GORDLEY, supra note 3, at 4.
4' The "gist of the action" of debt, that is, the defendant owes the plaintiff and
wrongfully withholds it, which derives entirely from German Law, constitutes a
clear example of this borrowing. See J. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2
HARV. L. REV. 1, 16 (1888). Much of the debate around cause and
consideration originated in the fact that Blackstone, and several 19th century
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they decided those cases. 48 In turn, all civil law theory has its origin in
Roman law, as codified in the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian, and as
subsequently developed in Continental Europe and around the world.49
The formation of contracts in civil law jurisdictions is based on
an agreement by the parties' ° which must extend to all essential terms of
the contract: consent of the parties; their capacity to contract; the
existence of a certain object forming the matter of the contract; and, a
lawful cause. However, in some civil law states, such as Argentina 51 or
Louisiana,52 the civil code expressly states that consent must be given in
the form of offers or proposals from one party to the other, which must
be accepted by the other; and, it regulates the offer and acceptance in a
way that resembles U.S. common law contract theory.53 For example, in
Argentina the rules dealing with the offer prescribe that offers may be
common law authors, borrowed directly from civil law explanations of cause to
define and explicate the notion of consideration. However, cause and
consideration may not be deemed identical, for they are not governed by the
same principles and they do not even act similarly.
48 See GORDLEY, supra note 3, at 5.
49 However, unlike common law, civil law developed from the most modem
Roman law solutions. See ALTERINI, supra note 36, at 15.
50 Pitman B. Potter, Doctrinal Norms and Popular Attitudes Concerning Civil
Law Relationships in Taiwan, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 265, 268 (1995).
Contract law borrows from the theories of free will and private autonomy and
espouses the primacy of freedom of contract as the basis for creation and
enforcement of private obligation. Id. at 269.
51 See C6D. CIV. art. 1144 (Arg.).
52 See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1927 (West 1987) ("A contract is formed by the
consent of the parties established through offer and acceptance").
53 See RESTATATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 50-70 (1981). Since a
contract is formed when the offer is accepted, common law developed a series of
important rules dealing with when, how, and by whom an offer may be
accepted. These rules indicate that an acceptance is effective for bilateral
contracts when the acceptance is sent in accordance with the forms prescribed
by the offeror. Id. § 50. This shows that "the offeror is the master of his offer,"
that is, the offeror may prescribe the method by which the offer may be
accepted. Id. § 30 cmt. a. If not sent by an authorized medium, acceptance is
effective when it is actually received by the offeror. Id. § 50. If the offeror does
not prescribe a form for the acceptance, the acceptance may be given in any
reasonable method. Id. § 65. For unilateral contracts, acceptance is effective
when the offeree has begun to perform. Id. § 54.
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revoked as long as they have not been accepted,54 except when the
offeror has waived his right to revoke them, or, he has obliged himself to
maintain them for a certain period of time.55 Also, for the acceptance of
the offer, like in the United States,56 Argentine law follows the "mailbox
rule, 57 whereby the contract is formed once the offeree sends acceptance
of the offer. 8
Another example of convergence takes place in the space field.
Space launch agreements share a very high degree of uniformity in their
main elements, structure, and organization in both common law and civil
law jurisdictions.5 9 The structure, as well as the wording, of these
contracts follows the organization, structure, and language of the
contracts generally used in common law practice.60 In launch services
contracts in civil law and common law states, the most important clauses
54 See COD. Civ. art. 1150 (Arg.).
55 Id.
56 See RESTATATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1981).
5' However, unlike U.S. law, the offeree may revoke his acceptance before it is
received by the offeror even if the acceptance has already been dispatched. In
U.S. contract law, if the acceptance is sent before the revocation of the
acceptance, the contract is formed and the revocation of the acceptance has no
legal effect. Id.
58 The requirements for contract formation in civil law are greater in quantity
and more complex than in common law, such as the object requirements.
However, some of these requirements-or at least similar ones based on the
same underlying policy-are also present in common law, albeit in a different
aspect of and with a different role in contract law, with slightly similar
consequences, such as the civil law lesion exception and the common law
unconscionability defense. See ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN, THE CIVIL LAW
SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS FOR THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 529
(1957). The lesion defence may be invoked when a party, exploiting the need or
inexperience of the other, obtains disproportionately advantageous terms. See,
e.g., CODIGO CIVIL DE CHILE [CbD. Clv.] art. 1888 (Chile).
59 See generally Tanja L. Masson-Zwaan, The Martin Marietta Case or How to
Safeguard Private Commercial Space Activities, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
THIRTY-FIFTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 239 (1992)
(discussing the impact of the Martin Marietta case on space launch agreements
internationally).
60 See VALERIE KAYSER, LAUNCHING SPACE OBJECTS: ISSUES OF LIABILITY AND
FUTURE PROSPECTS 244 (2001).
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are the ones embodying the risk management system.6' This includes "a
complex system of reciprocal waivers of liability, indemnification
granted by the states, commitments to obtain insurance, limitations of
liability, sole contractual remedies in the event of default, exclusion of
liability clauses, [and, the inclusion of the best efforts principle, or]
obligations de moyens, . . . among other [contractual clauses]."62 The
risk management systems included in these contracts derive from
remarkably similar prescriptions in the law of these states,63 with the
consequent result that risk management clauses in most of these
agreements throughout the civil law and common law realms are virtual
carbon copies. 64
Additionally, the doctrinal analyses on these agreements are also
analogous in the civil law and common law worlds.65 Civil law authors
freely base their analysis and doctrinal comments on U.S. and other
common law works66 and U.S. authors rely heavily on civil law
61 Julian Hermida, Risk Management in Arianespace Space Launch Agreements,
25 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 143, 144, 155 (2000).
62 Julian Hermida, Legal Aspects of Space Risk Management: The allocation of
risks and assignment of liability in commercial launch services 9 (2000)
(unpublished LL.M. thesis, McGill University, Montreal) (on file with author).
63 In the United States, see 49 U.S.C. §§ 70101-70121 (2000) (governing
commercial space launch activities), formerly the Commercial Space Launch
Act of 1984 (CSLA), as amended 1988. In France these regulations are
embodied in agreements executed at the national and agency levels. See JULIAN
HERMIDA, LEGAL BASIS FOR A NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION 155 (2004). In
Australia, the Australian Act on Space Activities contains a detailed and
exhaustive regime on responsibility and liability. See Space Activities Act, No.
123, Part 4 Division 1 (1998) (Austl.), available at http://fraise.univ-
brest.fr/-kerrest/IDEI/Australie-spaceact.pdf. (last visited Mar. 25, 2005) In the
Russian Federation, the Space Activity law contains the provisions regarding the
reallocation of liability arising from space activities. See Law of the Russian
Federation "About Space Activity," No. 5663-1 (1993) (Russ.), available at
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/national/russianfederation/decree_56
63-1_E.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
'A Hermida, supra note 62, at 9.
65 JULIAN HERMIDA, COMMERCIAL SPACE LAW: INTERNATIONAL, NATIONAL
AND CONTRACTUAL ASPECTS 129 (1997).
66 See, e.g., LEOPOLD PEYREFITTE, DROIT DE L'ESPACE 102 (1993)(examining
launch service contracts); KAYSER, supra note 60, at 150; Anibal H. Mutti,
Contrato de transporte especial, 6 REVISTA DEL INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE
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treatises,67 especially since judicial decisions in the United States are
marginal due to the existence of legislatively 68 mandated contractual
waivers of liability,69 which bar the possibility of making claims to the
contract counterpart, as well as its contractors and subcontractors 7° and
the special characteristics of the space industry. 1
Another illustration of this phenomenon lies in the nature of the
obligations of the space launch carrier. In the United States, the nature of
the services rendered by the carrier are given by the best efforts
principle,72 whereby the launch services provider limits its obligations to
make its best efforts instead of warranting the actual placing of the
satellite in orbit.73 In other words, by means of the best efforts principle,
the parties refrain from promising the accomplishment of their respective
obligations, committing themselves only to making their best efforts to
achieve success. 74 This coincides with the obligations de moyen nature,
which these agreements have in French law,75 where the object of the
DERECHO AERONAUTICO Y ESPACIAL 73 (1986); MIREILLE COUSTON, DROIT
SPATIAL ECONOMIQUE 241 (1994)(examining launch service contracts).
67 See, e.g., R. BENDER, SPACE TRANSPORT LIABILITY: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 7 (1995); GEORGE D'ANGELO, AEROSPACE BUSINESS
LAW 125 (1994) (examining launch service contracts).
6849 U.S.C § 70112.
69 S. COMM. ON COM., SCI., AND TRANSP., 100TH CONG., COMMERCIAL SPACE
LAUNCH ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1988 14 (Comm. Print 1988).
70 Pamela L. Meredith, Risk Allocation Provisions in Commercial Launch
Contracts, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW
OF OUTER SPACE 264, 267 (1991).
71 See KAYSER, supra note 60, at 150.
72 HERMIDA, supra note 65, at 17.
73 See generally Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd, Best Efforts Principle and Terms of
Contract in Space Business, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIRST
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 330 (1988) (discussing the "best
efforts principle" in space launch contracts).
74 HERMIDA, supra note 65, at 17. This principle is associated with both a
reduction and a waiver of liability and is one of the techniques used for the
contractual allocation of risks among the participants in a commercial space
transaction.
75 Under French law, Arianespace launch services agreements have been
categorized within the scope of article 1779 of the French Civil Code, which
governs industry and services leases, thus stressing the obligations de moyen as
one of its central features. In French law, the obligations de moyen entail a duty
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contract is not the carriage of the payload from one site to a certain orbit
but, rather, the efforts to place it in orbit. 6
This process toward convergence does not mean that civil law
and common law are one and the same.77 On the contrary, as will be
analyzed below, there are still important differences virtually in every
area of these two systems. However, these differences mainly deal with
a different order of priority in sources, i.e., civil law gives predominance
"to doctrine (including the codifiers' reports) over jurisprudence, while
the opposite is true in the common law.",78 The style of judicial decisions
is also different, e.g., "civil law judgments [use] a more formalistic
[discourse] than common law [decisions]. 7 9  The style followed by
scholarly authors also differs in both systems.80 According to Tetley, the
to do one's best as opposed to the obligations de resultat, which require a duty
to achieve a particular outcome. CIVIL CODE [C. CIV.] art. 1779 (Fr.). It read as
follows: "there are three principal species of hiring of labour and industry: (1)
the hiring of workmen who engage themselves in the service of any one; (2) that
of carriers, as well by land as by water, who are charged with the conveyance of
person, or commodities;(3) that of persons who undertake work by estimate or
by contract."
76 For this reason, French authors, as well as some Argentine commentators,
postulate that the nature of the agreement does not fall within the traditional
category of transportation agreements in the strict sense. See Mutti, supra note
66, at 73.
77 Merryman, supra note 11, at 357, 359. For Merryman, there is a process of
convergence and divergence taking place at the same time. Merryman sees the
root of divergence in the redistribution of local power and major separatist
movements in the Western world.
78 Tetley, supra note 24, at 701. Tetley explains "this difference in priority
through the role of the legislator in both traditions. French civil law adopts
Montesquieu's theory of separation of powers, whereby the function of the
legislator is to legislate, and the function of the courts is to apply the law.
Common law, on the other hand, finds in judge-made precedent the core of its
law," id.
79 Id. at 702. "Civil law decisions are indeed shorter than common law decisions,
and are separated into two parts-the motifs (reasons) and the dispositif (order).
This is because civil law judges are especially trained in special schools created
for the purpose, while common law judges are appointed from amongst
practising lawyers, without special training," id.
80 See Gwenaalle Postic, Comparaison of the sources of Law in the French Civil
law system and in the Australian Common law system 19, Actualite Juridique
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common law author "focuses on fact patterns .. .[and] analyzes cases
presenting similar but not identical facts, extracting from the specific
rules, and then, through deduction, determines the often very narrow
scope of each rule, and sometimes proposes new rules to cover facts that
have not yet presented themselves.",8' Tetley states that the civil law
author "focuses rather on legal principles ... [and] traces their history,
identifies their function, determines their domain of application, and
explains their effects in terms of rights and obligations ... [to deduce]
general and exceptional effects. '2  The differences also encompass
diverse interpretation methods.83 As Tetley points out, "[i]n civil law
jurisdictions, the first step in interpreting an ambiguous law . .. is to
discover the intention of the legislator by examining the legislation as a
whole,84 including the [preparatory works], as well as the provisions
more immediately surrounding the obscure text." 85 Tetley notes that
"[i]n common law jurisdictions . . . statutes are to be objectively
constructed according to certain rules86 standing by themselves" against a
case law background."8'
(May 28, 2003), at http://www.droit-ntic.com/pdf/c120030520.pdf (last
accessed November 7, 2004).
81 Tetley, supra note 24, at 701
82 Id. at 702.
83 See F. H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 45
(Greenwood Press 1977) (1953).
84 See Shael Herman, The Fate and Future of Codification in America, 40 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 407, 413 (1996).
85 Tetley, supra note 24, at 704.
86 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION To COMPARATIVE LAW
265-68 (3d rev. ed. 1998).
87 Tetley, supra note 24, at 704. However, when analyzed in light of the other
traditions, such as Talmudic, Islamic, Hindu or Asian, it is easy to observe that
the similarities between civil law and common law outweigh their differences.
For example, Talmudic and Islamic traditions are rooted in the word of God as
revealed in sacred books. See GLENN, supra note 14, at 87. Hindu law is
wrapped in Hindu philosophy and theology. GLENN, supra note 14, at 160. The
differences between common law and civil law are, as seen above, mainly in
style, terminology, interpretation, conception and emphasis on certain elements
over others rather than on their structure or fundamental philosophical
conceptions. The comparisons between civil law and common law, on the one
hand, and the rest of the legal traditions, on the other, exceed the scope of this
article. Reference to some of these differences have been included here only as
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Both civil law and modem U.S. common law share similar
fundamental social objectives,88 which include the protection and
encouragement of individual and personal rights, and are both enrolled in
a liberal philosophy and conception of the world. 9 Thus, each of their
doctrinal structures is based on similar legal concepts. They both divide
private law into large legal fields, such as property, tort, and contracts,
among others, and analyze these fields in a similar way. Their
organization of the law, and its larger concepts, are also alike even if
particular rules are not.90
IM. Criminal Law in Civil Law Jurisdictions
Unlike common law, where, despite some substantive
differences in various jurisdictions, there is a somewhat uniform
understanding of offenses, in civil law jurisdictions, there are two
competing schools that dispute the monopoly on the interpretation of
criminal offenses: the Causalist school and the Goal-oriented school. 91
The Causalist school, which traces its origins to the works of Franz von
Liszt, Gustav Radbruch and Ernst Beling, is centered on the disvalue of
the caused result.92 The causal explanation of crime departs from an
ideal or idealized concept of conduct. It conceives the action as a
mere illustrations and are not part of the thesis sustained in this article, that is,
that civil law and common law are gradually moving toward convergence,
where the theory of offense in the criminal realm is one example of this
phenomenon.
88 See Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of Precedent in the Quest for First
Principles in the Reform of the Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons From the Civil
Law and Realist Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 200-201 (2000).
89 See Ernst Rabel, Private Laws of Western Civilization, 10 LA. L. REv. 431,
448 (1950).
90 See GORDLEY, supra note 3, at 4.
91 In a very loose sense, their debates resemble those of common law's
retributivism vs. utilitarianism, but the main difference is that both Causalist and
Goal-oriented schools focus primarily on the theory of offense rather on the
theory of punishment. In the modem civil law world, the debate has a clear
victor in both academic and judicial circles: the Goal-oriented school. In
common law, both retributivists and utilitarians deeply influence different
aspects of criminal law.
92 j. R. du Plessis, Hans Welzel's Final-Conduct Doctrine-An Importation from
Germany We Could Well Do Without, 101 S. AFR. L.J. 301, 309 (1984).
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voluntary physical movement that causes a result that is captured by the
definitional terms and it relegates the analysis of its goal to the analysis
of blameworthiness, i.e., both dolus (will) and culpa (negligence) are
treated as part of the reproach. 93 It has been widely criticized because it
ignores and negates the constitutive function of the will as a factor for
directing the action, and because it understands the act as a mere causal
process triggered by any voluntary act.94 It fails to recognize that every
act is a work where human will directs its external causal happening.
The Goal-oriented, also known as the Final Conduct, school
departs from Hans Welzel's work.95 It is premised on a different
conception of conduct, which is considered a goal-oriented and voluntary
act. Its analysis is intrinsically intertwined with both its external
manifestation and the actor's goals. While the emphasis of the Causalist
school is on the disvalue of the result, the Goal-oriented school's stress is
on the disvalue of the action.96 For Welzel, "crime should be viewed
teleologically, in other words, in terms of [its] purpose or [goal]. 97 A
crime is an action that falls within the definitional terms of the offense
and is wrongful, unjustified, and blameworthy, and may be attributed to
the actor for not having conformed to the norm.98
In practice, an action analyzed in light of the Causalist and the
Goal-oriented schools will have different consequences. The Causalist
school, for example, understands attempted crimes as a mere causal
process that does not produce a result. The Goal-oriented school analyzes
it as an action that aims at a desired result where the will still plays a
primordial role even if the intended result does not take place. 99
Both schools have in common the fact that they attempt to
explain all crime phenomena in an abstract and comprehensive fashion.
Civil law jurisprudence places a considerably higher importance on
general theories and abstract principles than its common law
93 See HANS WELZEL, EL NUEVO SISTEMA DEL DERECHO PENAL: UNA
INTRODUCCION A LA DOCTRINA DE LA ACCION FINALISTA 51 (Montevideo and
Buenos Aires: B de F 2001).
94 See Id.
95 See du Plessis, supra note 92, at 309.
96 See ENRIQUE BACIGALUPO, DERECHO PENAL: PARTE GENERAL 80 (2d ed.
1999).
97 Du Plessis, supra note 92, at 310.
98 See WELZEL, supra note 93, at 97.
99 See id. at 52.
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counterpart.100 This difference stems from the origins of both systems.
Civil law has emerged as "reason's instrument," based on the Greek
tradition of "rational enquiry," the Aristotelian concept of the "excluded
middle," deductive thought, and "constructions [with a great] normative
and explanatory force."' 0 ' It is, therefore, "highly systematized and
structured and relies on declarations of broad, general principles, often
ignoring the details.' l02 The theories of offense in civil law jurisdictions
reflect the origin and methodology of civil law. Since the goal-oriented
theory permits a better understanding of the offense, and has increasingly
been adopted in the civil law world in Germany, Italy, Spain, Latin
America, 10 3 the analysis of the theory of offense in civil law is done
through the lens of this theory.
Action
The Goal-oriented theory of offense departs from a real and
teleological concept of act, which is conceived as a voluntary and end-
oriented doing. It is centered on the notion that an action may only be
understood as far as the agent's goal is perceived.'0 4 Derived from
Welzel's conception, the notion of act is the backbone of the theory of
offense. It constitutes a reaction to the causal mode of understanding that
prevailed in Continental criminal law at the beginning of the last
century. °5 It constitutes a premise upon which the whole theory of
offense has been built. Hence, if there is no act, there may not be an
offense. For Welzel, human action is the exercise of a goal-oriented
activity, which is based on the fact that the human being may foresee,
100 Arthur Taylor von Mehren, LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: A GENERAL AND
COMPARATIVE VIEW 3 (1988); Ponoroff, supra note 88, at 200.
1o1 GLENN, supra note 14, at 132-135.
102 Tetley, supra note 24, at 683.
103 See Stanislaw Pomorski, Reflections on the First Criminal Code of Post-
Communist Russia, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 375 at 383 (1998); BACIGALUPO, supra
note 96, at 49.
1
0 4 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 438 (1978).
105 "Hans Welzel and his followers advanced an even more radical thesis: that
objective harm to legally protected interests is only of marginal importance. It is
rather the negative societal quality of the conduct itself, as colored by the
wrongful state of mind, that makes conduct antisocial." Stanislaw Pomorski, On
Multiculturalism, Concepts of Crime, and the "De Minimis" Defense, 1997
B.Y.U. L. REV. 51, 71-72.
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within certain limits, the possible consequences of his conducts and
direct his activities towards a certain goal. 10 6 Thanks to his causal
knowledge, he may orient the external causes in accordance with his
objectives and dominate these causes completely. Thus, a goal-oriented
activity is conceived as an activity consciously aimed at the fulfillment
of objectives according to a plan.10 7 As these objectives are based on the
capacity of the will to foresee - again, within certain limits- the
consequences of its intervention in the causal course and on its capacity
to direct and redirect this course, according to a plan; the nucleus of the
action is the will. It constitutes the factor that configures and directs the
causal course.'0"
In civil law jurisdictions, for analytical purposes, the act is
divided into internal and external aspects. 0 9 The internal aspect of the
act consists of the goal and the selection of the means to achieve the
goal. The external aspect of the act is the actual materialization or
exteriorization of the act.110 For example, in a murder, the defendant first
represents her goal, i.e., the death of a person, and the means to achieve
the death, including all concomitant results."' This ontological
conception of the act derives from an Aristotelian view of conduct, for
whom, every activity has an end or goal. 12 Criminal law in civil law
jurisdictions departs its analysis of the offense from this ontological
conception of action.
Therefore, absence of act- and thus the end of the need to
continue the inquiry about whether there is a crime or not- involves
those situations where there is no voluntary human act. These situations
include irresistible physical force," 3 whether arising from a third person
or from a natural force, or from an involuntary state, which includes the
state of unconsciousness and the incapacity to direct one's actions, such
106 See WELZEL, supra note 93, at 51.
107 See id.
108 See id.
'09 See BACIGALUPO, supra note 96, at 245.
110 See E. R. ZAFFARONI, MANUAL DE DERECHO PENAL: PARTE GENERAL 339
(2003).
"..See Id. at 339.
112 ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 153 (R.W. Browne trans., 1853)
(Book VI, Chapter II of The Nicomachean Ethics).
113 See, e.g., CODE PItNAL [C. PtN] art. 122-2 (Fr.).
VOL. 13
CRIMINAL THEORY
as in the case of a neurological defect that impedes the control of one's
movements.' 
14
In common law jurisdictions, the concept of action has been
reduced to a mere movement generated by the will, which "minimizes
the importance of the desires... of the actor."'"15 This notion reminisces
many of the elements of the causal theory of acting which Welzel and his
followers reacted against.''
6
Definitional terms of the offense
The definitional terms are a legal and logically necessary device,
of a predominantly descriptive nature, whose main function is to
individualize the actions that are criminally relevant."17 The inquiry of
the existence of a crime consists of analyzing whether a particular
conduct falls into the criminal definition of the offense.
Contingent on the goal of the conduct, there are willful and
negligent definitions. Depending on the way in which the prohibited
conduct is individualized, there are active and omissive definitions.
These categories can, of course, be combined."18 Basically, the active
definitional terms contain the description of the prohibited act, such as
the prohibition to kill another human being." 9 Its omissive counterpart
describes the due act, and thus all other acts are prohibited. 2 °
Willful definitional terms
The willful and active definitional terms have a dual objective
and subjective nature, where the definitional terms individualize
conducts according to the circumstances which are both in the external
and internal, psyches, of the individual. While the willful definitional
terms always imply a result- objective aspect of the definitional terms- it
is characterized by the will of this result, i.e. the subjective willful
aspect.' 2' Thus, for example, the definitional terms for simple homicide,
114 See, e.g., CODIGAL PENAL [COD. PEN.] art. 34 (Arg.).
115 FLETCHER, supra note 104, at 440.
116 See WELZEL, supra note 93, at 51.
117 See ZAFFARONI, supra note 110, at 355.
118 See BACIGALUPO, supra note 96, at 314.
"9 See, e.g., KRIMINALLIKUMS [KRLM.] § 116 (Lat.) (Latvian Criminal Code).
120 See, e.g., CODIGO PENAL [BOL. C.P.] art. 13 (Bol.).; COD. PEN. art. 108
(Arg.).
121 See ZAFFARONI, supra note 110, at 355.
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theft and sexual assault state that whoever causes the death of another
human being,'22 takes away another's property, 123 or engages in sexual
conduct without his or her partner's consent, 124 is, respectively,
criminally liable.
The objective aspect of the willful definitional terms includes the
result, the descriptive elements, the normative elements, the agents or
actors- both active and passive- and a causal connection between the act
and the result.125 The result of the act implies a physical mutation, or
change in the outside world, as there is no act without a result. Similarly,
as in common law, the result is the negation or endangering of a legally
protected interest, such as life, 126 national defense, 127 or consented adult
relations.1
28
Descriptive normative elements in the definitional terms refer to
other circumstances included in the definitional terms that resemble the
common law concept of attendant circumstances. Examples of
descriptive normative elements include age in statutory rape 129 or the
concept of eligible voter in electoral crimes. 130 The causal connection
between the act and the result implies an analysis that is similar to the
"but for" test used in common law jurisdictions.'
31
The subjective aspect comprises the dolus and other subjective
elements. 132 The dolus is the central element, and it connotes the will to
realize the subjective definitional terms. 133  It also necessarily
122 C. PtN art. 22 1-1 (Fr.).
123 KRIM. § 175 (Lat.).
"' CODIGAL PENAL [C.P.] art. 181 (Spain).
125 See BACIGALUPO, supra note 96, at 244.
126 CODICE PENALE [C.P.] art. 575 (Italy).
127 CHINESE CRIMINAL CODE [C.C.c] ch. VII (P.R.C.) (People's Republic of
China).
128 C6D. PEN. art. 116 (Arg.).
129 C.C.C art. 236 (P.R.C.).
130 § 107b STRAFGESTZBUCH [StGB] (F.R.G.) (Germany).
131 Dennis Klimchuk, Causation, Thin Skulls and Equality, 11 CAN. J. L. &
JuRis. 115, 118 (1998).
132 See BACIGALUPO, supra note 96, at 314.
133 For a historical analysis of the notion of dolus in civil law criminal theory,
see L.A. Zaibert, Intentionality, Voluntariness, and Culpability: A Historical-
Philosophical Analysis, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 459 (1997).
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presupposes knowledge.134 Thus, its structure consists of two aspects:
cognitive and volitional. 35 The cognitive aspect requires the effective
knowledge, and a somewhat present knowledge, of the objective
elements of the definitional terms, i.e., the descriptive and normative
elements, the result and causal connection. 36 In turn, the volitional
aspect includes the direct dolus, i.e., when the defendant directly wants
the result, first degree, or when the result is the necessary consequence of
the chosen means,137second degree, such as when a defendant plants a
bomb in an airplane to kill one passenger and ends up killing all
passengers and crew, 38 and the eventual dolus or dolus eventualis - when
the defendant imagines the possibility of a concomitant result and
includes it within the dolus of the chosen act.'
The direct dolus of first degree equates to the intentional or
purposeful mens rea of common law.' 40 Second degree direct dolus is
equivalent to the mens rea of knowledge and the eventual dolus
counterpart in common law is recklessness.' 4' So, despite a difference in
terminology and some minor differences in the application and views,
the general principles and conception of crimes requiring a willful state




In those cases where there is no dolus, there are no willful
definitional terms; therefore, unless the crime is susceptible to being
committed negligently, there is no need for further inquiry and thus no
134 Felix A. Cifredo Cancel, La Intencion y los Otros Elementos Subjetivos del
Injusto Penal en los Sistemas Anglosajon y Civilista." Hacia Una Teoria
Unitaria, 63 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 39, 48 (1994).
' See, e.g., 33 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 3062 (2001).
136 BACIGALUPO, supra note 96, at 316.
137 ZAFFARONI, supra note 110, at 415.
138 Id.
139 See Monica Feria Tinta, Commanders on Trial: The Blaskic Case and the
Doctrine of Command Responsibility Under International Law, 47 NETH. INT'L
L. REv. 293, 304-05 (2000).
140 HENDLER, supra note 7, at 142.
141 Cifredo Cancel, supra note 134, at 69.
142 See HENDLER, supra note 7, at 142.
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crime. 43 The goal-oriented theory of offense is also concerned with the
case where behavior does not coincide with any or all of the elements of
the willful definitional terms. 44 A behavior is not considered to fall
within the willful definitional terms if an objective or subjective aspect is
missing. For example, there is absence of objective aspect of the
definitional term if there is no wrongful result,1 45 such as in the case of
contraband if a person does not actually exit the country or does not even
go through customs with prohibited goods.146 In this case, there may be
an attempted crime of contraband, but not contraband.
Another situation is when there is no causal link between the
conduct and the result, i.e., when, using common law terms, the "but for"
test147 is not satisfied. Other situations include the absence of attendant
circumstances, when, for example, speeding does not occur in a public
street but in a closed course in a private estate, 148 or where the actor or
the victim does not possess the requirements set forth in the definitional
terms, such as in a case of bribery where the person who receives money
is not a public officer or a person with special public service
obligations. 149
The absence of subjective aspects gives rise to an error or
mistake, namely, there is dissonance between the objective facts' 50 and
the actor's subjective perception of the facts.' The mistake may be
over the descriptive elements of the definitional terms. In the crime of
sexual assault, there is a mistake if the defendant thinks he is raping a
14 See generally Carlos Chinchilla Sandoval, El Error de Tipo, 10 CIENCIAS
PENALES: REVISTA ASOCIACION DE CIENCIAS PENALES DE COSTA RICA, 51
(1995), available at http://www.cienciaspenales.org/revistalOf.htm (last visited
Mar. 25, 2005); Alonzo Salazar, Error de tipo y error de prohibicion en la
dogmatica hispoamericana, 20 CIENCIAS PENALES: REVISTA ASOCIACION DE
CIENCIAS PENALES DE COSTA RICA 56 (2002), available at
http://www.cienciaspenales.org/revista IOfhtm (last accessed October 22, 2004).
144BACGALUPO, supra note 96, at 325.
145 See, e.g., KRIM. § 190 (Lat.) (smuggling provision).
146 See, e.g., C.C.C § 153 (P.R.C.) (smuggling provision).
147 1 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 35
(3d ed. 2000).
141 See, e.g., KRiM. § 260 (Lat.) (traffic safety provision).
"41 § 332 StGB (F.R.G.).
150 See, e.g., C.P. arts.14.1, 14.2 (Spain).
151 FLETCHER, supra note 104, at 683.
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doll when in fact he is having un-consensual sex with a woman. 152 A
mistake may also arise from the normative elements of the definitional
terms. This would be the case, for example, when a person who believes
he is a juror, but is not, discusses a criminal case he believes he is trying
with another person, when in fact he has been called only as a witness
and no such prohibition exists.1 53 The mistake may also be about the
causal links. The common law doctrine of transferred intent 154 has also
been analyzed in civil law under the Latin name of aberratio ictus.1
55
The majority of authors that subscribe to the goal-oriented theory tend to
dismiss this doctrine as irrelevant, and thus, the missed target will give
rise to any inchoate crime and the unintended target may originate a
negligent crime, if such a crime may be committed negligently.
56
Negligent definitional terms
The "negligent" definitional terms individualize the act because
of the way the result is achieved. The conduct is not penalized on
account of its targeted result but on account of the causal chain selected
to achieve the proposed result.' 57 This way of achieving a result violates
a general duty of care.158 However, the degree of care that is required for
each crime varies significantly according to the circumstances. 59 Thus,
for example, the defendant's targeted result may be a legitimate one,
such as arriving early at work, but the conduct to achieve that result,
speeding, may violate the required duty of care. 160
152 See, e.g., CODIGO PENAL DE PUERTO RICO [P.R.] § 99 (P.R.) (rape
provision).
151 See KRIM. § 295 (Lat.) (interference in a trial of a matter).
154 See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 135 (1998).
155 Damdsio de Jesus, Aberratio Ictus e Imputagdo Objetiva.,COMPLEXO
JURiDICO DAMASIO DE JESUS, (March 2002), at
www.damasio.com.br/novo/htmlframe-artigos.htm (last accessed on October
24, 2004).
156 See SANTIAGO MIR PUIG, DERECHO PENAL PARTE GENERAL 101 (6th ed.
2002).
157 BACIGALUPO, supra note 96, at 344.
158 ZAFFARONI, supra note 110, at 425.
159 Id.
160 See C.P. art.382 (Spain) (traffic provision).
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Traditionally, some civil law jurisdictions had created a
negligent offense, called crimen culpae,161 which was an omni-
comprehensive crime that caught virtually all criminally negligent
conduct, or directly admitted that any willful crime could be committed
negligently. 62 Now, the majority of criminal codes in civil law countries
have resorted to the creation of some specific crimes which may only be
committed negligently.
63
There are both objective and subjective aspects of the negligent
definitional terms. The objective aspect includes: the violation of the
duty of care, the causal connection, the result, and the determinant
relation between the violation of the duty of care and the result.' 64 The
test used is, again, the "but for" test, 65 where the result would not have
occurred but for the violation of the duty of care. 166 The subjective aspect
includes the will to carry out the conduct in the selected manner and the
foreseeability that the conduct will cause the result. 67 This permits two
degrees of knowledge: conscious negligent, 168 where defendant foresaw
the result and rejected that possibility, such as when defendant while
driving a car at high speed considered that his speeding may cause the
death of a pedestrian, but he trusted that he would be able to prevent the
death by dodging the pedestrian or stopping the car 69; and, unconscious
negligent, 170 where defendant could have foreseen the result but did not
16a See STS, July 16, 2002 (R.J., No. 1330) (Spain).
162 CODIGO PENAL PARA EL DISTRITO FEDERAL [C.P.D.F.] art. 60 (Mex.)
(Mexico) (repealed January 10, 1994).
163 See Julio F. Mazuelos Coello, El delito imprudente en el Cddigo penal
peruano. La infracci6n del deber de cuidado como creaci6n de un riesgo
juridicamente desaprobado y la previsibilidad individual, DERECHO PENAL:
ASPECTOS FUNDAMENTALES DE LA PARTE GENERAL DEL CODIGO PENAL
PERUANO 147 (2003) (examining negligence in the Peruvian Penal Code),
available at http://www.unifr.ch/derechopenal/anuario/03/Mazuelos.pdf (last
visited Mar. 25, 2005). See also, e.g., KRIM. §§ 10, 123 (Lat.); CODIGAL PENAL
[PORT. C.P.] art. 15 (Port.) (Portugal); C.P. art. 43 (Italy).
164 ZAFFARONI, supra note 110, at 428.
165 1 WITKIN AND EPSTEIN, supra note 147, at § 35.
166 ZAFFARONI, supra note 110, at 426.
1671 d. at 428.
168 BACIGALUPO, supra note 96, at 344.
169 See KRiM. § 260(2) (Lat.) (traffic provision).
170 BACIGALUPO, supra note 96, at 344.
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do it. 7' Conscious negligence equates to a reckless state of mind




As in the willful definitional terms, the goal-oriented theory also
admits situations where there is absence of negligence.1 73  First and
foremost, there is no negligence if there is no violation of a duty of care,
such as in the case where an aircraft pilot abides by all air navigation
rules and an accident still takes place.1 74 Like in the willful definitional
terms, lack of causal connection entails absence of negligence. Take, for
instance, an aircraft pilot who neglects to switch off the automatic pilot
when required, and the aircraft crashes to the land. If the plane, in fact,
crashes because of a bomb explosion in the cabin, there is no negligence
on the part of the pilot. 175 Absence of negligence also occurs if there is
no wrongful result, such as when a car driver runs over a corpse
believing that it was a human being. 76 The same applies if there is no
determinant relation between the violation of the duty of care and the
result, such as if a negligent vessel captain runs over a swimmer who is
suicidal. 77  Here, even if the captain was negligent, there is no
determinant relation, as the wrongful suicide would have taken place
even if the captain had not been negligent.
Additionally, there is an absence of negligent definitional terms
if there is no subjective aspect of negligence. This situation includes
lack of will to carry out the conduct in the selected manner. This would
be the case where an aircraft pilot lands her aircraft negligently due to
deliberately wrongful instructions given by terrorists who usurped a
171 ZAFFARONI, supra note 110, at 427.
172 Civil law jurisdictions do not differentiate among degrees of negligence, as
some common law states do.
173 SANDOVAL, supra note 143.
174 MARIO 0. FOLCHI, Los DELITOs AERONAUTICOs 212 (1970).
"' See, e.g., C6DIGo AERONAUTICO [COD. AERO.] art. 218 (Arg.) (Argentina).
176 Cuban criminal law permits the conviction of the offender in the case of these
so-called impossible crimes if the offender is considered to be dangerous.
CODIGO PENAL [CUBA C.P.] art. 14, Ley No. 62 de 29-12-1987 (Asamblea
Nacional del Poder Popular, Gaceta Oficial Especial No. 3 de 30-12-1987, pig.
51) (1987) (Cuba). This is a characteristic of Soviet law rather than civil law.
177 ZAFFARONI, supra note 110, at 431.
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control tower, and the pilot believes she is making the right maneuvers to
land. 78  The other situation involves the unforeseeability of the
possibility that the conduct will cause the result. This would take place,
for example, if a person turned his car on and a bomb planted by another
person exploded, killing the driver and the passengers.' 79
Omissions
Civil law countries distinguish two types of omissions: proper
and improper.'8" The proper omission is characterized by the fact that
any person can be held criminally liable for conduct that deviates from
the one stated in the definitional terms.' In this respect, action and
omission are merely two different legislative techniques to prohibit
conduct. 82 While the active definitional terms single out the prohibited
conduct, its omissive counterpart defines the due conduct, and thus all
other acts remain forbidden. 183  The Argentine Criminal Code, for
example, holds criminally liable whoever fails to help a minor that is
lost, or any individual that is injured or threatened by an imminent
danger, when assistance can be safely rendered. 84 Here, the due conduct
is the obligation to help the lost minor or the injured individual
respectively, and any other conduct, such as walking by or driving on, or
even just watching the minor or injured person without doing anything,
are forbidden behaviors.
The other type of omission is the improper omission. In this
case, only those individuals who have special characteristics may be held
criminally liable. 185 The main requisite is that the defendant be in a
178 See LEGISLACION AERONAUTICA Y ESPACIAL 23 (1989) (Section 78 of the
Paraguayan Aeronautical Code).
179 See FRANCIsCO CASTILLO GONZALEZ, EL CONCURSO DE DELITOS EN EL
DERECHO PENAL COSTARRICENSE 40 (1981).
180 Rafil Sanjudn L6pez, La comisi6n por omisi6n: el articulo 11 del C6digo
Penal, 52 BOLETiN JURiDICO DERECHO.COM (2002), at
http://www.derecho.com/boletin/articulos/articulo0166.htm (last accessed
October 24, 2004).
'8'BOL. C.P. art. 13 (Bol.).
182 ZAFFARONI, supra note 110, at 449.
183 Id.
184 COD. PEN. art. 108 (Arg.).
185 See, e.g., § 13 Nr. I StGB (F.R.G.). The German Penal Code states that
"whoever fails to prevent a harm which is part of the constitutive elements of a
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guarantor position that obliges him to protect, or repair, the legal interest
protected by the norm. 186 Like in common law,' 87 this position emanates
from the law'88: the obligation to feed one's children; a contract, 89 such
as the case of a nurse hired to take care of a patient; or, from a previous
conduct,' 90 such as when someone urges another to swim across a river
promising that he will follow her in a boat in case she needs help.' 9' In
these cases, there are no express omissive definitional terms, but the
court must read into the active definitional terms the due conduct.' 92
Thus, for example, if a patient dies because his nurse reads a book
instead of watching and taking care of him, the nurse commits murder.
The court is obliged to interpret that the due conduct in such a case is to
take care of the patient, and any other act, such as reading a book, is
considered prohibited.' 93
Absence of omission
In the proper omission, there is absence of omission if the
situation described in the definitional terms is not present, such as the
absence of danger in the obligation to render assistance to people that are
threatened of an imminent danger.' 94 There is also absence of omission
if there is an impossibility to perform the due conduct. This is the case if
the person in question may endanger her own life if she provides help,'
95
crime may be punished under this Code only if he was under a legal duty to
prevent the harm, and if his failure to act was equivalent to an affirmative act for
purposes of establishing the statutorily defined constituent elements of the
crime."
186 See PUIG, supra note 156, at 181.
187 See generally Arthur Leavens, A Causation Approach To Criminal
Omissions, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 547 (1988) (examining history of causation
through omission in common law).
188 See C.P. art. 1 l(a) (Spain); § 13 StGB (F.R.G.); CODE PtNAL [C. PtN] art.
223-6 (Fr.); BOL. C.P. art. 178 (Bol.).
189 See C.P. art. 11 (a) (Spain)..
190 See id. art. 11 (b).
191 ZAFFARONI, supra note 110, at 450.
192 See, e.g., BOL. C.P. art. 251 (Bol.).
193 Like its active counterpart, the omissive definitional terms may be either
willful or negligent.
194 See L6pez, supra note 180.
See C.P.D.F. art. 15(V) (Mex.).
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or when there is no causal link, also referred to as avoidance link, i.e.,
when the wrongful result would have taken place even if the defendant
had carried out the due conduct. For example, when a person fails to help
a lost minor return to her parent's custody, but it may be proved that the
minor would not have accepted help in any case.
196
There is absence of omissive definitional terms in the proper
omission type if the defendant is not the guarantor, i.e., it is not legally
obliged to act.197 There may also be absence of omission due to the non-
presence of any of the subjective elements of the omission, such as
mistake over the person in the proper omission. An example of this is
when a person ignores a child that needs feeding, which is her own child
or, when there is a mistake on the causal link or the possibility of
providing assistance. 198 This would take place if a person is sinking in a
pond, and a passerby who does not know how to swim does not think he
will be able to provide assistance without himself sinking, but it turns out
that the pond was shallow and the passerby never would have sunk.
Wrongfulness
The second analytical component of the criminal action is its
wrongfulness. 199 This implies a contradiction of the act with the entire
juridical order. The action that falls within the definitional terms of the
crime is considered to be anti-normative; but, it is not anti-juridical if it is
based on a permissive precept, justification, which may emanate from
any part of the juridical order.200 In other words, these conducts have
some of the characteristics of the crime but their anti-juridical aspect is
missing.2 ' Only when the action that falls within the definitional terms
is not excused by any justification is it also considered anti-juridical.
196 See COD. PEN. art. 108 (Arg.).
9 See C.P.D.F. art. 16 (Mex.).
198 See ZAFFARONI, supra note 110, at 455-57.
199 WELZEL, supra note 93, at 97.
200 ZAFFARONI, supra note 110, at 451.
201 See generally Eduardo Calderon Ramos, Estado de Necesidad Como
Excluyente de Responsabilidad (1977) (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis,
Universidad de El Salvador), at
http://www.csj .gob.sv/BVirtual.nsf/O/5c8f494e2fac9ae806256b3e00747bdd?Op




In civil law, the causes of justifications do not derive only from
criminal law, but they may emanate from any aspect of the whole
juridical order.2 °2  These causes of justification depend on each
jurisdiction. In most civil law jurisdictions, generally, these include self-
defense, which may be used for the defense of life, bodily integrity, and
both personal and real property;2° 3 necessity; 2° 4 and, legitimate exercise
of a right.20 5
In general, like in common law, 20 6 self-defense always
constitutes a justification.20 7 Certain requirements need to be met for
there to be self-defense.20 8 Generally, these are: the existence of an
illegitimate conduct, lack of provocation on the part of the defender, and
the use of rational or proportional means to repel the conduct.20 9
Additionally, since the goal of this justification cause is the defense, it
presupposes knowledge of the aggression.210 The illegitimate conduct
211implies a wrongful act on the part of the aggressor. In Spain, the Penal
Code differentiates the types of goods that are being attacked to
determine the illegitimacy of the attack. In the case of personal goods,
an illegitimate attack is only a crime that endangers those goods or a
crime that may imply the imminent loss of those goods. In the case of
202 See, e.g., C. PEN art. 122-4 (Fr.) ('A person is not criminally liable who
performs an act prescribed or authorized by legislative or regulatory provisions.
A person is not criminally liable who performs an action commanded by a
lawful authority, unless the action is manifestly unlawful') (translated from
original French).
203 See, e.g., § 32 StGB (F.R.G.); C.P. art. 20(4) (Spain); COD. PEN. art. 34
(Arg.); C. PEN art. 122-5 (Fr.).
204 See, e.g., § 34 StGB (F.R.G.); BOL. C.P. art. 11(2) (Bol.); C. PEN art. 122-7
(Fr.).
205 See, e.g., C.P. art. 20(4) (Spain); COD. PEN. art. 34 (Arg.); BOL. C.P. art.
11(3) (Bol.).
206 See generally 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 158 (1998) (stating the general
requirements for the necessity defense).
207 See George. P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV.
949, 976 (1985).
208 See, e.g., KRIM. § 29 (Lat.) (listing requirements for self-defense to apply,
such as use of force proportionate to the force one is repelling).
209 See, e.g., C.P. art. 20(4) (Spain).
210 BACIGALUPO, supra note 96, at 359.
211 See, e.g., CODIGO PENAL COLOMBIANO [COD. PEN. COLOM.] art. 32(6)
(Colom.).
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one's own dwelling house, the mere illegitimate entrance constitutes an
attack, which may be repelled.212 The lack of provocation implies that the
defender must not have initiated the aggression. If he did, and defends
his life by killing the aggressor, his action will not be justified, but may
result in a diminution of his blameworthiness.213 The means by which to
repel an illegitimate aggression are not generally defined in the codes but
are subject to the courts' interpretation. The codes generally limit
themselves to enunciate general rules. For example, the French Penal
Code determines that the relationship between the means used for the
defense and the seriousness of the attack must be proportional.
214
The defense of third parties is also generally considered another
justification. It has the same elements of the self-defense.215 However, if
the defended has initiated the illegitimate attack, the third party may
defend him, provided the third party has not participated in the attack,
even if that third party is aware of the fact that he is defending someone
that started an illegitimate act of aggression.1 6
Another justification is necessity, where the law justifies a
defendant who commits an act that falls within the definitional terms
with the intent to avoid a greater evil. Unlike in common law, 217 this
212 See, e.g., C.P. art. 20(4) (Spain).
213 See ZAFFARONI, supra note 110, at 477.
214 See C. PtN art. 122-5 (Fr.), which states:
A person is not criminally liable if, confronted with an
unjustified attack upon himself or upon another, he performs
at that moment an action compelled by the necessity of self-
defence or the defence of another person, except where the
means of defence used are not proportionate to the seriousness
of the offence. A person is not criminally liable if, to interrupt
the commission of a felony or a misdemeanour against
property, he performs an act of defence other than wilful
murder, where the act is strictly necessary for the intended
objective the means used are proportionate to the gravity of
the offence
(translated from the original French at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codestraduits/codepenaltextan.htm).
215 See, e.g., C.P. art. 20(4) (Spain).
216 See ZAFFARONI, supra note 110, at 479.
217 See generally 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 158 (2004) (listing cases in the
United States addressing necessity as a defense).
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justification is widely accepted in most civil law jurisdictions.218 The
analysis of what constitutes a lesser or greater evil depends on the
hierarchy of the goods involved, the degree of the harm, and the degree
of the proximity of danger. However, in general, when human lives are
in conflict, the necessity defense is not available, even if one life is
sacrificed to save several others.219
Finally, another general cause of justification is the legitimate
exercise of a right, i.e., where a person exercises a legitimate action
authorized by the legal order.22°  In other words, absence such
authorization, the exercise of that action would constitute a crime. For
example, the Argentine Civil Code authorizes a creditor to exercise a
right of retention to withhold a personal good of his debtor which has
been given to the creditor under contract.22 In Dutch law, "under strict
conditions a right of retention can be exercised also to withhold
immovable property..., [such as when] a building contractor [that]
remains unpaid... refuse[s] access to the building."222 The exercise of
the right of retention does not constitute a crime even when the retention
falls within the definitional terms of a crime.
Blameworthiness
Blameworthiness, or culpability, is the criminal attribution of the
wrongful act to the actor because he did not conform to the norm when,
according to the specific circumstances of his action, he was required to
do S0.223 This notion of blameworthiness is based on normative grounds,
which determine the reasons for holding people accountable for their
deeds.224 There are two general requirements for the attribution of a
wrongful act: first, the fact that the actor was required to comprehend the
wrongfulness of his act; and second, that the circumstances of his act
218 See BACIGALUPO, supra note 96, at 132.
219 See ZAFFARONI, supra note 110, at 481.
220 See COD. Civ. art. 3245 (Arg.).
221 Id.
222 J.H.M. van Erp and L.P.W. van Vliet, Real and Personal Security, 6.4 ELEC.
J. OF COMP. L. (2002), at http://www.ejcl.org/64/art64-7.html (last accessed
November 5, 2004) (addressed under section 5, right of retention).
223 See WELZEL, supra note 93, at 149.
224 See FLETCHER, supra note 104, at 457.
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have not reduced his self-determination capacity below a certain
threshold.22
There is no culpability where there is no possibility of
understanding the wrongfulness of the act or when the threshold of self-
determination is not met.226 The former takes place when the actor lacks
mental capacity to comprehend the wrongfulness of his action, as well as
when there is a prohibition mistake.22' This comprehension includes both
the knowledge of wrongfulness and its internalization; comprehension
entails appropriating the norms and making them part of one's own
psychological apparatus. To a certain extent, whoever commits a
serious crime has not internalized the norms. But criminal law does not
demand an actual and effective comprehension of the wrongdoing but
rather the possibility of understanding it.229 The degree of effort the
actor used to internalize the legal values and conform to them is
inversely proportional to the degree of culpability.2 30 The threshold of
self-determination is not met when the actor cannot orient his actions
according to his understanding of the wrongdoing or when a conduct
other than the one contemplated in the norm is not required. 3
IV. Criminal Law In Common Law Jurisdiction
232Unlike civil law, in common law there is no general theory of
the offense;2 33 In common law jurisdictions, courts and scholars are not
concerned with the elaboration of a theory that is capable of explaining
the existence, or nonexistence, of crimes and their components in a
general and comprehensive way. 3 Nonetheless, all crimes have some
225 BACIGALUPO, supra note 96, at 423.
226 WELZEL, supra note 93, at 150.
227 ZAFFARONI, supra note 110, at 509.
228 BACIGALUPO, supra note 96, at 232.
229 ZAFFARONI, supra note 110, at 512.
230 Id.
231 WELZEL, supra note 93, at 151.
232 See Tetley, supra note 24, at 702.
233 See ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN, LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: A
GENERAL AND COMPARATIVE VIEW 3 (1988).
234 L. A. Zeibert asserts:
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basic common elements and common doctrinal structures, which permit
235their description and analysis from a general perspective. The basic
common elements of a crime in common law jurisdictions are actus
reus236 and mens rea,23 7 together with the absence of justifications and
defenses.238
However, two opposing schools of thought dominate criminal
law policy in common law countries: utilitarianism and retributivism.
239
While these schools are primarily concerned with theories of
punishment, 240 their main ideas affect most areas of criminal law and
criminal justice policy and have shaped many substantive aspects of the
theory of offense.2 4' Utilitarianism in criminal law emerges from the
[T]he neglect of philosophical analysis in the Anglo-American
criminal legal tradition is apparent at two different levels. The
first is at the general level and regards the very definition of
crime. Within the Anglo-American legal tradition, systematic
attempts to present the set of necessary and sufficient
conditions for something to be a crime are rare.
Philosophical Analysis and the Criminal Law, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 101, 104-
105 (2000).
235 KENT ROACH, CRIMINAL LAW: ESSENTIALS OF CANADIAN LAW 8 (2d ed.
2000).
236 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 126 (1998).
237 Id. See also U.S. v. Spy Factory, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 684, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
("mens rea is an essential element of any criminal offense").
238 Some common law scholars also include the coincidence between the mens
rea and the actus reus, and the causation of harm as elements. These elements
are dealt with here within the three general categories: actus reus, mens rea and
absence of defenses or justifications. ROACH, supra note 235, at 8.
239 See generally Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution and the Secondary Aims of
Punishment, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 105 (1999) (discussing why a retributivist
approach is better than a utilitarian approach).
240 See United States v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192, 200-204 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(discussing the differing views of punishment under the retribution and
utilitarian approach); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism and Liberalism, 37
ARIZ. L. REv. 73, 79 (1995).
241 See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as
an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1313,
1314-15 (2000).
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works of Italian civil law scholar Cesare Beccaria,242 whose ideas
changed the existing criminal justice landscape throughout an
Enlightened Europe.243  On the British Isles, Jeremy Bentham
enthusiastically embraced his ideas.244 The main tenets of utilitarianism
are that criminal and deviant behavior occurs when an offender decides
to risk violating the law after balancing the potential value of the
criminal enterprise against the potentiality of being apprehended, as well
as the severity of the punishment.245 For utilitarians, criminals have
control over their behavior, they choose to commit crimes and they can
be deterred by the threat of punishment.246 Thus, deterrence becomes the
central purpose for punishment, which is conceived as a tool and not an
end in itself. 247 To help prevent crime, punishment, and adjudication,
should be swift, severe and certain.248 A severe punishment, however, is
only that which is severe enough, but not more so, to outweigh the
personal benefits derived from crime commission. Although widely
received in modem common law legislation, utilitarian ideas have been
criticized-especially in the academe- for their potential consequences
when taken to the extreme.249 Pure utilitarianism can be used "to justify
242 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci trans.,
1963).
243 See Guyora Binder, Democracy and Punishment: Punishment Theory: Moral
or Political?, 5 BUFF. CRM. L. R. 321, 335 (2002) (discussing Beccaria's
views).
244 See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION 11-12 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996) (1823); Jeremy
Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 365
(1962).
245 FRANCIS T. CULLEN & ROBERT AGNEW, CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY: PAST TO
PRESENT: ESSENTIAL READINGS 247-48 (1999).
141 Id. at 250.
247 See Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules:
Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 19, 60 (2003).
248 See generally Michael H. Marcus, Comments on the Model Penal Code:
Sentencing Preliminary Draft No. 1, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 135 (2003) (examining
the need for better crime reduction methods in public policy)..
249 See H.J. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment, in




punishment of the innocent in [those rare instances] where, on balance,
greater general deterrence or other social good can be achieved.,
250
The retributive criminal justice school puts forward the idea
"that punishment is justified when it is deserved.",25' They believe that
"[r]etribution is essentially the infliction of harm on offenders on the
basis that they deserve it as a result of their crimes. 25 2 For Kant, who
together with Hegel pioneered retributive thinking in the criminal justice
sphere,253 civil society has a moral duty to restore the balance of justice
when it is affected by a crime. The only way to restore justice is by
punishing the criminal by giving him what he deserves. When analyzing
the extreme case of this postulate, Kant himself made it very clear that:
even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself with the
consent of all its members... [] the last Murderer lying
in the prison ought to be executed before the resolution
was carried out. This ought to be done in order that
everyone may realize the desert of his deeds, and that
blood-guiltiness may not remain upon the people; for
otherwise they might all be regarded as participators in
the murder as a public violation of Justice.254
Unlike utilitarianism, "retributivism looks backward and justifies
punishment only on the voluntary commission of a crime. 2 5  The
primordial criticism of retributivism is that it promotes an eye for an eye
250 Don E. Scheid, Constructing a Theory of Punishment, Desert, and the
Distribution of Punishments, 10 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 441, 442 (1997).
251 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 16 (3d ed. 2001).
252 Deirdre Golash & James P. Lynch, Public Opinion, Crime Seriousness, and
Sentencing Policy, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 703, 710 (1995).
253 See G. W. F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T. M. Knox trans.,
1967); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (John
Ladd trans., 1965).
254 IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT, 198
(W. Hastie trans., 1887).
255 DRESSLER, supra note 251, at 16.
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philosophy and that it advocates punishment even in those situations
where there is no social benefit.
25 6
Both schools of thought have greatly influenced criminal
jurisprudence in the common law world, particularly in North
America, 257 and consequently, criminal law does not adhere uniformly to
one of these theories,2 58 but rather "some of [its rules] are
[fundamentally] retributive in nature, 59 whereas others are utilitarian. 26 °
Thus, for example, "it is [common] to find partially utilitarian
justifications" emphasizing the deterrent value of legal sanctions, which
are retributive "in their justification of the content" of the prohibition. 6'
This is so because both theories have been "dominant... at [different]
times [without winning] the ultimate debate... [and] both... have
attracted [the attention of the criminal] lawmakers [and society]. 262
Actus reus
The substantive theory of actus reus263 emerged along similar
lines in both civil law and common law. In both systems, it originated in
the evidentiary requirement of the presence of corpus delicti for the
criminal conviction. When this procedural rule turned substantive, the
256 Hart advanced the idea that a theory of punishment must incorporate both
utilitarian and retributivist principles since pure utilitarian or retributive notions
alone are not satisfactory enough to conform an adequate and pluralistic theory
of punishment. Hart's ideas shaped contemporary criminal justice debate and
greatly influenced modem criminal law in the common law world, particularly
in North America. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 234-235
(1968).
257 See Bradley, supra note 239, at 113-14.
258 See Cotton, supra note 241, at 1314-15. The Model Penal Code
fundamentally relies upon a utilitarian understanding of the purposes for the
criminal law, but it has not divested itself of retributive elements. Id. at 1319,
1324.
259 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the
Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1499 (1974).
260 DRESSLER, supra note 251, at 22.
261 Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 503
(1992).
262 DRESSLER, supra note 251, at 22.
263 See People v Shaughnessy, 319 N.Y.S.2d 626, 628 (N.Y. Dist. Ct.1971)
("[T]he physical element requirement has been designated as the Actus Reus").
264 H. SILVING, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 293 (1971).
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issue was expressed "in terms of... whether the concrete occurrence
corresponded to an abstract crime description," with common law and
civil law taking separate doctrinal paths.265
Actus reus is defined as "the physical act specified in the
,,266crime. The actus reus is comprised of "a voluntary act... that
causes... social harm"; causation is the nexus between the act and the
social harm.267 The act constitutes the physical element of a criminal
268 ~ bact. It must be voluntary, which excludes reflexes and convulsions, as
well as acts performed during a state of unconsciousness. 269 Typically,
the actus reus requirement is met when an agent acts voluntarily.27 °
Holmes states that "[t]he reason for requiring an act [as a precondition
for the existence of an offense] is, that [it] implies a choice, and that it is
[considered unfair] to make a [person] answerable for harm, unless he
might have chosen otherwise. 27' Interestingly, the debate between
retributive and utilitarian schools of punishment has not directly
influenced the concept of act in the common law. Utilitarian and
retributive arguments supporting the concept of voluntary act are
nonetheless imaginable. 7 Utilitarians would see little social benefit in
punishing a person who does not carry out a voluntary act.273 This
265 Id.
266 Lynnette S. Cobun, The Insanity Defense: Effects of Abolition Unsupported
by a Moral Consensus, 9 AM. J. L. AND MED. 471, 474 (1984).
267 DRESSLER, supra note 251, at 81.
268_Shaughnessy, 319 N.Y.S.2d. at 628.
269 See State v. Mishne, 427 A.2d 450, 458 (Me. 1981) ("[T]o be voluntary an
act must be the result of an exercise of a defendant's conscious choice to
perform them, and not the result of reflex, convulsion, or other act over which a
person has no control"). However, a self-induced state of involuntariness will
deprive the defendant of the "involuntary" defense, for he will be liable of
placing himself knowingly put in a position where the act may result. See
MODEL PENAL CODE [MPC] § 2.01 note 2 (1985).
270 See State v. Case, 672 A.2d 586, 589 (Me. 1996) ("a person commits a crime
'only if he engages in voluntary conduct"').
271 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 54 (Little Brown 1949)
(1881).
272 See Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1095 (1997).
273 See John A. Bozza, "The Devil Made Me Do It": Legal Implications of the
New Treatment Imperative, 12 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 55, 81 (2002) (discussing
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argument is not based on an idea of intrinsic justice, but on the belief that
punishing an involuntary offender would not effectively deter the
offender or other members of society who many commit similar
involuntary acts.274 Retributivism's major tenet is that the offender
deserves punishment when he "freely chooses to violate society's
rules., 275 An offender who does not act voluntarily- even if he produced
social harm- does not deserve to be punished. 7 6
"Social harm" has been "defined as the 'negation, endangering,
or destruction of [a socially valuable and legally protected interest,
whether] individual, [societal] or state. 277 It may adopt the form of a
wrongful result, wrongful conduct, or "attendant circumstances. 278
Social harm is expressed as a wrongful result when the offense is defined
in terms of a prohibited result.2 79 For instance, murder is a result crime
because the social harm is the death of another human being.28 ° Social
harm takes the form of wrongful conduct when the offense is described
in terms of injurious conduct, and no harmful result is required, such as
the case of possession of illegal firearms.28' In this case, the social
interest- to live peacefully without perils that may be triggered by the
the issue of deterrence). See also Vollbaum v. State, 833 S.W.2d 652, 656 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992) (discussing the issue of deterrence).
274 DRESSLER, supra note 251, at 14-15.
275 Id. at 16. See also Golash & Lynch, supra note 252, at 710.
276 DRESSLER, supra note 251, at 16.277 Id. at 110.
278 MPC § 1.13(9).
279 See Paul H. Robinson, Reforming the Federal Criminal Code.- A Top Ten
List, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 225, 235 (1997). Paul Robinson asserts:
[T]he Model Penal Code drafters invented a useful system for the precise
defimition of offenses. [It] distinguishes between (i) conduct, (ii) attendant
circumstances, and (iii) a result of conduct. These are the objective building
blocks for offense definitions. Each offense definition typically has at least one
conduct element, which satisfies the requirement of an act. Most offense
definitions include one or more circumstance elements as well, defining the
precise nature of the prohibition-for example, having intercourse with a person
under 14 years old-or the precise nature of a prohibited result... Some of the
potential benefits of the Model Penal Code's insight on categories of objective
elements is lost by its failure to defime those categories."
280 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 1 (1999).
281 Robinson, supra note 279, at 235.
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use of firearms- is endangered by the possession of illegal firearms.
282
The definition of an offense may include other elements defined as
attendant circumstances. An example of attendant circumstances is
common law burglary,283 which requires "the breaking and entering [in
the dwelling house of another at] night., 284 In this case the dwelling
house is the attendant circumstance, whose breaking and entering
constitutes social harm.285
The causal link requirement implies that for criminal liability to
arise, the act must cause the social harm.286 An act can cause harm when
the "but for" test is satisfied,287 or when the act is a substantial factor.
The former takes place when a particular result would not have occurred
but for the act.288 The substantial factor test is satisfied when there are
"two [or more] causes, each alone sufficient to bring about the harmful
result, operat[ing] together to cause it... [, and the defendant's] conduct
is a substantial factor in bringing about the result.
289
Additionally, the actus reus requirement means that there is no
criminal liability for an omission290 to act,29 1 save for the exceptional
282 See 20 TEX. JUR. Criminal Law § 1460 (discussing prosecution of unlawful
firearm possession by a felon).
283 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2(c) (4th ed. 2003).
284 See Tahir v Lehmann, 171 F. Supp. 589, 590 (N.D.Ohio 1958).
285 DRESSLER, supra note 251, at 111.
286 "[T]he defendant's act must be the legally responsible cause ("proximate
cause") of the injury, death, or other harm that constitutes the crime." 1 WITKIN
& EPSTEIN, supra note 147, at § 35.
287 California Jury Instructions: Criminal No. 3.40 (West 7th ed. 2003).
288 MPC §2.03.
289 Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law 155 (1997). 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4(b) (2d ed. 2003). As in tort law, "the [act]
must also be the legal (proximate) cause of the... harm," id. at § 6.4(a) n.10. The
criminal courts have borrowed the concept of "proximate cause" from tort law.
To find proximate cause a court must find that a person of ordinary prudence
could have reasonably foreseen that such a result, or some similarly injurious
result, was probable under the facts as they existed, the doctrine of proximate
cause was extrapolated to the criminal law context. Under the Model Penal
Code, the defendant's act will usually be the proximate cause of the harmful
result if the result is "not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have only
a bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense." MPC
§2.03(2)(b).
290 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 32 (1998).
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situations where "a 'legal duty' to act" exists.292 Similar to the civil law
situations, 293 there is a duty to act when there is a special relationship:
294
the relationship between a parent and a child295; a contract which creates
a duty to act, such as when a patient hires a nurse for obtaining and
rendering care; when the defendant himself caused the danger; or, when
the defendant undertook to render assistance to the victim.
296
Mens rea
The mens rea, or guilty mind, implies that the actor's mental
state coincides with the mental state required by the law for a particular
291 See Nicholson v. State, 600 So. 2d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 1992) (mother held
criminally liable for intentional deprivation of food to her child); People v.
Stanciel, 606 N.E.2d 1201, 1211 (Ill. 1992) (mother held criminally liable for
allowing her boyfriend to beat her daughter to death); People v. Gladden, 462
N.Y.S.2d 115, 116 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (holding that state must show that
mother intentionally failed to feed her child).
292 Arthur Leavens, A Causation Approach To Criminal Omissions, 76 CALIF. L.
REv. 547, 553-54 (1988).
293 ZAFFARONI, supra note 110, at 449.
294 LAFAVE, supra note 289, at § 6.2(a)(1); Bryan A. Liang & Wendy L.
Macfarlane, Murder By Omission: Child Abuse and the Passive Parent, 36
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 397, 406-410 (1999) (discussing the legal duty a parent
owes to her child and the legal penalties associated with failure to act in the civil
and criminal law contexts).
29559 AM. JUR. 2D Parent & Child § 14 (2002); Muehe v. State, 646 N.E.2d 980,
983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) ("A parent's failure to take appropriate steps to
protect his or her child from the abuse of the other parent is tantamount to
neglect of the child").
296 Wittgenstein, and other authors, criticizes the amalgamation of the concept of
voluntary act and intention. For Wittgenstein, "as the general doctrine of the
voluntary act posit the existence of acts of willing, then it would be possible to
have an act of will for another act of will, [which] is inconsistent," Zaibert,
supra note 133, at 483. This inconsistency is solved if, as in civil law doctrine,
the act is considered separately from the definitional terms or actus reus. In such
case, the concept of act is only concerned with voluntariness or its absence. In
other words, there is an action when it is the result of a voluntary movement,
regardless of the mental state or intention of the agent who performs such
voluntary action. See Id. at 489-92. In Hart's words, "[c]onduct is 'voluntary'...
if the muscular contraction which, on the physical side, is the initiating element
in what are loosely thought of as simple actions, is caused by a desire for those
same contractions," id. at 485.
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offense.2 97 It has been noted that "[t]he [notion] of mens rea... expresses
the principle that it is not conduct alone but conduct accompanied by
certain specific mental states which concerns... the law., 298 In other
words, this requirement is met when, at the time the agent committed the
crime, she had the legally requisite mental state that the law requires for
the existence of criminal liability. 299 "Except [for] minor offenses...,
[common law jurisdictions generally require] that there be a specified
[mens rea] for every element of an offense[,]" which includes the act
itself, and the social harm.300 The purpose of the inclusion of the mens
rea component is to describe the mental state in blameworthy, or
culpable, conduct that leads to criminal liability, as distinguished from
conduct that causes harm but is unaccompanied by the mental state
necessary to impose criminal liability.
30'
Both retributivists and utilitarians favor the mens rea
requirement albeit for different reasons. Utilitarianism embraces the
mens rea requirement, mainly on deterrence grounds. An offender
cannot be deterred from the commission of a criminal act unless he
appreciates that his conduct will lead to punishment. 30 2  Furthermore,
"the 'higher' mental states [such as purposefulness and knowledge]
reflect the greater probability that the defendant will [cause social]
harm. 303 Thus, "the severity and certainty of punishment" should also
297 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 27 (15th ed. 1993).The
courts have encountered extreme difficulty in resolving problems of "merger,"
"concurrence," and "multiplicity," i.e., in determining when acts or transactions
give rise to a single offense, and when they amount to several offenses. There is
also a problem in determining when one offense is deemed included within
another. The different situations in which the problems arise, and the several
distinct reasons for making the determination, account for the absence of any
single governing principle or test. See generally id.at §§ 25-28.
298 1 WITKIN AND EPSTEIN, supra note 147, at § 2.
299 Some crimes admit of only certain mental states. For example, some crimes
cannot be committed negligently or recklessly.
300 James B. Jacobs, Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN LAW 296 (Alan B. Morrison ed., 1996).
30 1 The policy purpose underlying the mens rea requirement is to filter out those
agents who unintentionally engage in bad conduct since they are not considered
dangerous to society.
302 DRESSLER, supra note 251, at 15.
303 Simons, supra note 261, at 505.
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increase as the need to deter the offender, "and others with similar
[guilty] mind [,]" is "greater. 30 4 From this, it is easy to infer "why
knowing and intentional killers are punished as murderers, [whereas]
those who are 'reckless'... are punished only for manslaughter. 3 5
Retributivists also favor the mens rea requirement, arguing that persons
who are blameworthy deserve to be punished. Those who lack a guilty
mental state do not deserve any punishment. The strongest arguments
condemning crimes without mens rea have come from retributivists,
particularly culpability-based retributivists, °6 who do not advocate
"punishing the blameless. 30 7  The mens rea requirements have been
traditionally grouped into two categories. The first category is crimes
requiring general intent, whereby the defendant simply desires to commit
a criminal act.308 The second category is crimes requiring specific intent,
where the defendant, in addition to desiring to bring about the actus reus,
wants to do something further.30 9 An example of a specific intent crime
is a burglary where the intended breaking and entering of another's
dwelling must be with the intention to commit a felony;310 or, where the
defendant objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 For a discussion of different forms of retributivism, see Darryl K. Brown,
Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1383, 1399 (2002).
307 Simons, supra note 272, at 1076.
308 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 127 (1998) ("'General intent' is the term
used to define the requisite mens rea for a crime has no stated mens rea...
Where a particular crime requires only a showing of general intent,... the
criminal intent necessary to sustain a conviction is shown by the very doing of
acts which have been declared criminal; the element of intent is presumed from
the actions constituting the offense"). See also Watson v. Dugger, 945 F.2d 367,
370 (11th Cir. 1991) ("In general intent crimes, the element of intent is
presumed from the actions constituting the offense"); Kohler v. Kelly, 890 F.
Supp. 207, 212 (W.D.N.Y. 1994), afid, 58 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1995) ("If the crime
charged requires only a general intent, intent will be presumed from the
intentional completion of the act"); State v. Campos, 921 P.2d 1266 (N.M.
1996)("[A] general-intent crime is one for which no additional intent to
accomplish a further goal is specified").
309 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 128 (1998).
310 See, e.g., Railey v. State, 121 S.W. 1120, 1122-23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1909).
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to act.31 This classification has been considered primitive and confusing,
and has marginal utility in practice.
312
More importantly, mens rea is considered to comprise four
distinct states of mind. 3  These states are: (i) purposeful, when a
defendant desires his conduct to cause a particular result;3 14 (ii) knowing,
when a defendant is aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause
a particular result; (iii) reckless, when defendant is aware of a risk-
which for the Model Penal Code,315 must be "substantial and
unjustifiable"- that his conduct might cause a particular result; 316 and (iv)
negligent, when defendant should be aware of a risk that his conduct
might cause a particular result.
317
These states of mind are also primitive and confusing, as they are
not mutually exclusive and they refer to cognitive aspects in some cases,
311 See, e.g., People v. Garland, 627 N.E.2d 377, 380-81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)
("Specific intent exists where from the circumstances the offender must have
subjectively desired the prohibited result"); State v. Corley, 703 So. 2d 653, 659
(La. Ct. App. 1997), writ denied, 712 So. 2d 875 (La. 1998) ("Specific intent is
the state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender
actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure
to act"); State v. Pierce, 488 S.E.2d 576 (N.C. 1997) ("Specific-intent crimes are
'crimes which have as an essential element a specific intent that a result be
reached'); State v. Esters, 927 P.2d 1140, 1142 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996), appeal
denied, 131 Wash. 2d 1024, 937 P.2d 1101 (1997) ("Specific intent is 'an intent
to produce a specific result, as opposed to an intent to do the physical act' that
produces the result").
312 See FLETCHER, supra note 104, at 23 (looking at the subject of larceny)
313 MPC §2.02 (2)
314 TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 2003).
315 MPC § 2.02(2)(c).
316 See, e.g., People v. Deskins, 927 P.2d 368, 371 (Colo. 1996) ("[A] person
acts recklessly 'when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that a result will occur or that a circumstance exists'); People v. Figueroa,
625 N.Y.S.2d 839, 842 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1995) ("A person is chargeable with
'recklessness' when he is aware of designated risk and consciously disregards
it").
317 See, e.g., Green v. State, 887 S.W.2d 230, 233 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) ("A
person acts with criminal negligence when he should be aware of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk he has created"); State v. Brooks, 658 A.2d 22, 26 (Vt.
1995) ("[Cjriminal negligence occurs when the actor should be aware that a
substantial and unjustifiable risk exists or will result from his conduct").
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and to volitional ones in others. Thus, "intention" and "knowledge"
make reference to different categories, and although they have been
artificially assigned some differences, they still refer to different aspects
of the mental process. More importantly, these categories cannot
account for all types of situations. For example, under the doctrine of
transferred intent, the actor is artificially assigned intent for a result he
causes where there is obviously no such intent.31 8 However, both courts
and legal scholars have widely accepted these mental states without
much criticism. 31 9 Similarly imprecise is the mens rea fiction created for
the felony-murder rule. 320  With felony-murder, criminal liability is
assigned to the defendant when he engages in certain dangerous felonies,
(such as bank robbery), and certain deaths occur, even if they are not
intended or even caused by the defendant. 32' Therefore, whenever a
defendant carries out a certain felony, such as kidnapping or aircraft
hijacking, and a death occurs- even if that death is caused by an
unrelated third person or by the victim herself- that death is attributed to
the perpetrator of the felony who is considered to have intended it.
322
The purposeful or intentional mental state implies a purpose or
willingness to commit the act, or the omission referred to. A person acts
intentionally "when it is [the person's] conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result. 323 Further, "willingness...
318 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 135 (1998).
319 See Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion, and the Fairness of Notice:
Confronting "Apparent Innocence" in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1, 9 (1995) (noting that these categories are the "modem American approach").
320 See, e.g., People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. 1965) ("The
felony-murder rule has been criticized on the grounds on the grounds that in
almost all cases in which it is applied it is unnecessary and that it erodes the
relation between criminal liability and moral culpability").
321 In Texas, for example, a person commits the offense of felony murder if the
person "commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and
in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in
immediate flight from the commission or attempt, [the person] commits or
attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death
of an individual." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(3) (Vernon 2003).
322 Furthermore, there are an increasing number of crimes, particularly those
created by legislation, where the actor's mental state cannot be explained by one
of these traditional four categories of mental state.
323 TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 2003).
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implies that the person knows what he is doing, intends to do what he is
doing, and is a free agent., 324 It does not require any intent to violate
law. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Morrissette that:
[t]he contention that an injury can amount to a crime
only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or
transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in
mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human
will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal
individual to choose between good and evil.325
As a way of illustration, mischief requires intention to destroy or
damage property.326 If, for instance, defendant wanted to damage
someone else's goods, he would be acting with the required mental state,
intention of mischief.
For Holmes, intent revolves around two aspects: the "foresight
that certain consequences will follow from an act[;] and[,] the wish for
those consequences working as a motive which induces the act., 327 An
exceptional application of this requirement, which is unheard of in civil
law jurisdictions, is the aforementioned doctrine of the transferred
328intent, which essentially applies to murders. It often occurs in bad aim
cases when a defendant intends to kill one victim, but in fact,
accidentally or unintentionally, 329 kills another one. 330 In this case, the
324 Ex Parte Trombley, 193 P.2d 734, 739 (Cal. 1948).
325 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 249 (1952).
326 See, e.g., Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, Part XI § 430(l)(a) (1985) (Can.)
(hereinafter R.S.C.).
327 HOLMES, supra note 271, at 53.
328 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 135 (1998).
329 See, e.g., State v. Fekete, 901 P.2d 708, 714 (N.M. 1995) ("the transferred
intent theory has been applied in so-called 'bad aim' situations where a
defendant, while intending to kill one person, accidentally kills an innocent
bystander or another unintended victim").
330 See, e.g., Miller v. State, 636 So. 2d 144, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) ("The
doctrine of transferred intent operates to transfer the defendant's intent with
respect to the intended victim to the unintended victim"); Crawley v. Com., 492
S.E.2d 503, 505 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) ('Under the common law doctrine of
transferred intent, if an accused attempts to injure one person and an unintended
victim is injured because of the act, the accused's intent to injure the intended
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defendant is culpable, and bears criminal liability for the murder of the
unintended victim to the same extent as if he had killed his intended
victim. In civil law, bad aim cases have a more reasonable solution. They
are considered attempted murders with respect to the intended victim, in
conjunction with a negligent homicide with regard to the unintended
one.
3 3 1
The concept of knowledge entails an awareness that defendant is
committing an act that is considered an offense.332 Again, "it does not
require any knowledge of the unlawfulness of such act or omission. 3 33
The Texas Penal Code states that "[a] person acts knowingly... when the
person is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances
then surrounding the conduct exist [; or,]... when he is aware that the
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result., 3 34 As the New York
Penal Code explains, "[t]he main distinction between [intentionally and
knowingly] is that the [former] entails a conscious desire to cause a
particular result by one's conduct and the [latter] entails an awareness
that the result is 'practically certain' to follow from such conduct. '335 "A
'knowingly' mens rea is a lesser standard than 'willfully'; if awareness
of conduct can be proven, it is permissible for a jury to infer knowledge
on the part of the actor.336  For example, in Liparota v. US., the
defendant was prosecuted for violation of a federal food stamp statute,
which prohibited fraud through improper use and transfer of food stamp
victim is transferred to the injury of the unintended victim, even though the
wounding was accidental or unintentional"); State v. VanValkenburgh, 856 P.2d
407, (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) ("Intent against any person generally may be
transferred to another if that other is injured").
331 See HENDLER, supra note 7, at 143.
332 See, e.g., State v. Williams, 503 N.W.2d 561, 566 (Neb. 1993)
("[K]knowingly... commonly imports a perception of the facts requisite to make
up the crime").
333 People v. Taylor, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 227, 235 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
334 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(b) (Vernon 2003).
335 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15 commission staff notes; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05
(1), (2) (McKinney 2003).336 Jonathan Snyder, Back to Reality: What "Knowingly" Really Means and the
Inherently Subjective Nature of the Mental State Requirement in Environmental
Criminal Law, 8 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV 1, 3 (2001).
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cards or coupons. This is a regulatory offense which requires proof that
defendant acted knowingly.
337
The "reckless" mental state occurs when a person is aware of a
"substantial and unjustifiable risk" that his or her act will cause, and
"consciously disregards" it. 338  Intent to cause serious bodily harm
murder requires that recklessness on the part of the defendant, who
intends to cause his victim bodily harm that he knows is likely to cause
death. 339  A defendant is acting recklessly if he is aware- under a
subjective test 34°- that death may ensue and consciously disregards this
possibility.34' In other words, "reckless" mens rea cannot be asserted on
an objective consideration of what a defendant should have known, 342 but
rather on defendant's perceived and consciously disregarded risk.
343
A "negligent" state of mind implies that the defendant should be
aware of a substantial and unjustified risk. Under Pennsylvania's
definition, for the person to be negligent, "[t]he risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it... involves a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person 344 would
observe in the actor's situation. 3 45 The difference between a "reckless"
and a "negligent" mens rea is that in the latter, defendant fails to perceive
a risk associated with conduct, while in the former, defendant perceives
and consciously disregards the risk.346 The test to determine the
337 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 434 (1985).
338 MPC § 2.02(2)(c).
139 See, e.g., R.S.C. Part VIII § 229(a)(ii) (Can.).
340 See Rutledge v. Springborn, 836 F. Supp. 531, 537-538 (N.D. Ill. 1993);
State v. Jupin, 602 A.2d 12, 18 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
341 Sarah D. Himmelhoch, Comment, Environmental Crimes: Recent Efforts to
Develop a Role for Traditional Criminal Law in the Environmental Protection
Effort, 22 ENVTL. L. 1469, 1477-1478 (1992).
342 See Rutledge, 836 F. Supp. at 537-538.
343 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 139 (1998).
344 The rationale of the reasonable person standard is to ensure that there is a
fixed, non-fluctuating parameter but rather a uniformed, objective standard
against which all accused are measured. Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the
Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical Assessment of the Use of
Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation Cases,
26 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 8 (1998).
345 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(b)(4) (West 2004). See also MPC § 2.02.
346 Conroy v. State, 843 S.W.2d 67, 71 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
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existence of negligence is that of reasonableness. Conduct that reveals "a
marked and significant departure from the standard" which would be
expected of a "reasonably prudent" person under the circumstances
indicates negligence.347 Ordinary negligence, sufficient for recovery in a
civil action, will not suffice in a criminal context.348 The defendant's
conduct must go beyond that required by the unreasonable risk test for
tort liability; it must amount to a gross, criminal, or culpable departure
from the standard of due care.349
Justifications and excuses
The third component of the offense in common law jurisdictions
is the absence of justification or excuse. In other words, the presence
of an excuse or justification may lead to the absence, or even inexistence,
of a crime. Justifications and excuses permit the exclusion, or reduction,
of criminal liability in conduct that would otherwise constitute an
offense. 351 Although different in origin, justification and excuse are
generally treated together, as both have a similar effect. They generally
include: (i) duress, 352 (ii) necessity,353 (iii) self-defense, 35 4 (iv) defense of
347 See Regina v. Tutton and Tutton, [1989] S.C.R. 1392, 1395 (holding that jury
should have considered parents belief in faith healing in case where child died
from the parents' depriving him of insulin).
348 See Letchworth v. Gay, 874 F. Supp. 107, 109-110 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (holding
that there must be criminal intent).
349 See People v. Penny, 285 P.2d 926, 937 (Ca. 1955)(jury should have been
instructed regarding criminal negligence, not civil negligence); People v.
Rodriguez, 8 Cal.Rptr. 863, 879 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960) ("In order to impose
criminal liability for a homicide caused by negligence, there must be a higher
degree of negligence than is required to establish negligent default on a mere
civil issue"); Somers v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 961, 967-968 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1973) ('[C]riminal liability is premised on intentional violations of the
law").350 See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law §§ 216, 217 (1998).
351 See U. S. v. Parr, 516 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1975) (justification and excuse are
affirmative defenses); Hightower v. State, 481 S.E.2d 867, 869-870 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1997) ("[T]he defendant [must] admit the crime before he can raise such
defense"); People v. Lemons, 562 N.W.2d 447, 453-454 (Mich. 1997)
(defendant has burden to prove duress).
352 21 AM. JUR. 2D, Criminal Law § 160 (1998).
353 MPC, § 3.02.
354 Id. § 3.04(1).
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others,355 (v) defense of property,356 (vi) parental disciplinary rights,357
(vii) law enforcement privileges,358 (viii) entrapment,359 (ix) mental
defenses negating responsibility, and (x) a very limited defense of error
of law. From a comparative law perspective, these defenses are of little
interest. Even though there are certain differences in the treatment of
each of these defenses, they are very similar in civil law and common
law, which is reflected in both the analysis of courts and authors.36°
Duress arises when the defendant is coerced to commit a crime
by the use of unlawful force against his person or another's person. The
threat must be "present, imminent, and impending" 361; and, it must
induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious personal bodily
injury if the crime is not carried out. Duress also includes the threat of
use of force.362 Unlike civil law, this defense is not available for
homicide, but in some U.S. states, duress may reduce the degree of
homicide.363
Like in civil law,364 the necessity defense entails choosing the
lesser evil.3 65 As a result of some force or condition, the defendant must
choose between committing a relatively minor offense or allowing
himself or others to suffer substantial harm to person or property.
However, there is a significant difference here between civil law and
common law. The necessity defense is considerably limited in Anglo-
355 19 TEX. JUR. Criminal Law § 435 (2001).
356 MPC § 3.06.(1); 21 TEX. JUR. Criminal Law § 1946 (2001).
357 See IOWA CODE § 234.40 (1994); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012 (1995); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1312(1) (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 121A.58
(West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-19-02 (1999).
358 See Mitchell N. Berman, Justification And Excuse, Law And Morality, 53
DuKE L. J. 1, 25 (2003).
359 25 OHIO JUR. Criminal Law § 711 (2000).
360 See HENDLER, supra note 7, at 66.
361 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abduction And Kidnapping § 56 (2004).
362 Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress:A
Justification, Not an Excuse - And Why It Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 833, 859
(2003).
363 See 21 AM. JUR. 2D, Homicide § 115 (2004).
'64 See C.P. art. 20(4) (Spain).
365 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 158 (1998).
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American jurisdictions, as it is not available in common law.366 Thus, in
common law jurisdictions, its existence is dependent on an express
statutory enactment. The Model Penal Code contemplates the necessity
defense for those situations in which the harm or evil to be avoided is
greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense
charged.367 In Canada, however, the courts may not balance the social
utility of breaking the law against obeying the law. The defense is
available in Canada only when the accused has no realistic choice but to
violate the law, and there is no other "safe avenue., 368 Like in most civil
law jurisdictions,3 69 the necessity defense is generally not available for
homicides under the common law.37 °
The self-defense justification also presents remarkable
similarities in both civil law and common law.37' In common law, a
person may use whatever force reasonably necessary, except for deadly
force, to prevent the immediate unlawful imposition of harm to
himself.372 The person resorting to self-defense may not use deadly force
unless the danger that is being resisted is also deadly force.373 The
Canadian Criminal Code states that "[e]very one who is unlawfully
assaulted without having provoked the assault is justified in repelling
force by force if the force he uses is not intended to cause death or
grievous bodily harm and is no more than is necessary to enable him to
defend himself",
374
366 See The Queen v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Eng. Rep. 273, 288 (Q.B. 1884)
(necessity is not a legal justification to murder).
367 MPC § 3.02(1)(a).
368 R. v. Hibbert, [2001] 2 R.C.S. 973, 979.
369 ZAFFARONI, supra note 110, at 481.
370 See People v. Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) ("The
defense may be available where a defendant is charged with committing any
criminal act except the taking of an innocent human life").
371 BACIGALUPO, supra note 96, at 359.
372 John F. Wagner Jr., Annotation, Standard for Determination of
Reasonableness of Criminal Defendant's Belief for Purposes of Self-Defense
Claim, that Physical Force is Necessary-Modern Cases, 73 A.L.R. 4TH 993,
996 (1989).
173 See R.S.C. Part I § 34 (Can.).
171 Id. at 34(1). Further, "every one who is unlawfully assaulted and who causes
death or grievous bodily harm in repelling the assault is justified if [:] (a) he
causes it under reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm from
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As in civil law jurisdictions,375 the requirements for self-
defense 376 include the repression of only present or imminent377 use of
unlawful force by another, and the use of only reasonable means to
repress that force.378 Like in civil law,379 the person resorting to self-
defense may not have been the aggressor. 380 However, if he was a non-
deadly aggressor he may defend himself against deadly force with deadly
381
force, but only if he completely withdrew after his initial aggression.
In some common law jurisdictions, courts extend the benefits of
self-defense to cases that fall within the classification of battered spouse
syndrome. In these cases, when a woman kills her partner after being
physically abused, or kills to prevent another attack, she may avail
herself of the benefits of self-defense,382 even if the killing in self defense
the violence with which the assault was originally made or with which the
assailant pursues his purposes; and (b) he believes, on reasonable grounds, that
he cannot otherwise preserve himself from death or grievous bodily harm," id. at
34(2).
171 See COD. PEN. art. 34 (Arg.); C.P. art. 20(4) (Spain); COD. PEN. COLOM. art.
32 (Colom.)
376 See State v. Urbano, 589 N.W.2d 144, 151 (Neb. 1999) ("To successfully
assert the claim of self-defense, a defendant must have a reasonable and good
faith belief in the necessity of using force and the force used in defense must be
immediately necessary and justified under the circumstances").
177 See McGarity v. State, 5 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) ("'imminent'
means something that is impending, not pending; something that is on the point
of happening, not about to happen"); Darty v. State, 994 S.W.2d 215, 218 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1999) ("An 'imminent harm' occurs when there is an emergency
situation, and it is 'immediately necessary' to avoid that harm when a split-
second decision is required without time to consider the law").
378 Jeremy Horder, Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress: Understanding the
Relationship, 11 CAN. J.L. & JuRIS. 143, 144 (1998).
"9 See C.P. art. 20(4) (Spain).
380 Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in
the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1985);
Cynthia K.Y. Lee, The Act-Belief Distinction in Self-Defense Doctrine: A New
Dual Requirement Theory of Justification 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 191, 207
(1998).
3 8 'John S. Baker, Jr., Definition of Crime- Vagueness; Proof of "Unlawful
Purpose", 45 La. L. Rev. 251, 259-260 (1984).
382 Commonwealth v. Rodriquez,, 633 N.E.2d 1039, 1041-1042 (1994) (woman
fatally stabbed her boyfriend who had been abusing her) ("There can be no
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is not the consequence of an imminent peril.3 8 3 In these circumstances,
the courts have tended to relax some of the requirements of self-
defense.84 In order to avail herself of this defense, a woman who kills or
attacks her abusive spouse or partner must prove that she has been
through the battered woman cycle at least once.385 This cycle includes
the tension-building phase, followed by the explosion or acute battering
incident, culminating in a contrition phase - often referred to, as the
"honeymoon" phase. 386 Additionally, she must prove, usually through
expert opinion,387 that she has experienced learned helplessness and that
she suffers from a series of symptoms by which the syndrome can be
diagnosed.388 These requirements make the defense quite narrow as they
exclude those women who opt to defend themselves without
experiencing the whole syndrome cycle. Even worse, the courts impose
the burden of being assaulted and reconciled in order to be able to use
this defense.
The right to defend others38
9 and the right to defend property
390
are quite similar in both civil law and common law jurisdictions. 9'
bright line: in one circumstance, an act of two weeks earlier might be too
remote, while in another, an act of two years before may not").
383 Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their
Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REv. 371, 381 (1993).
384 Erin M. Masson, Annotation, Admissibility of Expert or Opinion Evidence of
Battered-Woman Syndrome on Issue of Self-Defense, 58 A.L.R.5th 749, 763
(2004).
385 Jimmie E. Tinsley, Criminal Law.- The Battered Woman Defense, 34 AM.
JUR. POF 2D 1, 24 (1983).
186 LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 55-70 (1979).
387 Cynthia Lynn Barnes, Annotation, Admissibility Of Expert Testimony
Concerning Domestic- Violence Syndromes To Assist Jury In Evaluating Victim's
Testimony Or Behavior, 57 A.L.R.5th 315, 337 (2004).
388 See Mary Ann Dutton, Critique of the "Battered Woman Syndrome" Model,
Applied Research Forum, National Electronic Network on Violence Against
Women,(1996), at
http://www.vawnet.org/DomesticViolence/Research/VAWnetDocs/AR-bws.pdf
(last accessed October 26, 2004).
389 See Daniels v. State, 215 S.W.2d 624, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948) (allowing
right to defend third person); Rylee v. State, 117 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1938) (allowing protection of third person as a defense); Valadez v. State,
408 S.W.2d 109, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (allowing jury to decide if
defendant was justified in protecting third person); Townsend v. State, 93
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Basically, "a person is justified in using force to protect a third person
when the [latter] is threatened [under] circumstances [which] would
[allow the third person] to protect himself and, the actor reasonably
believes that intervention is immediately necessary. 3 92 A person may
also use force -even deadly force in some jurisdictions 393- "to prevent or
terminate an unlawful entry upon land;" the use of force is necessary, as
it affects property in the actor's possession, to prevent confiscation, or to
recapture personal property when the other person's interference with the
property is unlawful.3 94
The limited right of parents to use force to discipline their
children 395- whereby parents are allowed to cause physical pain by
hitting, paddling, spanking, slapping, or any other physical force against
their children- is similar in civil law countries and has generated agitated
debates in the last few years.396 Law enforcement agents are entitled to
violate the law when it is reasonable to do SO.397 In other words, these
acts would be criminal if not performed by law enforcement agents, such
as applying force, entering into property or depriving people of liberty.3 98
Unlike common law,399 these privileges are not treated as special
S.W.2d 156, 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1936) (allowing jury to consider defense of
protecting third person).
90 MPC § 3.06.(1).
391 See HENDLER, supra note 7, at 141.
392 Hamel v. State, 916 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
393 See Phoenix v. State, 640 S.W.2d 306, 306-307 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)
(deadly force can be used only in self-defense, when "immediately necessary,"
and where no lesser force is possible or would place the person at a greater risk
of substantial harm); 22A AM. JUR. 2D Death § 135 (2004) (can only use deadly
force to protect property where there is "an element of danger to the person" or
"to prevent a felony").
394 MPC § 3.06.(1).
395 See note 357.
396 See generally Mary Kate Kearney, Substantive Due Process and Parental
Corporal Punishment: Democracy and the Excluded Child, 32 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1 (1995) (discussing whether parents should have the right to corporally
punish their child).
397 Berman, supra note 358, at 24-25.
398 DRESSLER, supra note 251, at 273.
399 SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL
LAW 111 (1987).
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defenses in civil law countries, but are considered within the general
causes of justification that would not trigger criminal liability.
40 0
Entrapment,4°3 which arises when a law enforcement agent
induces a defendant to commit the crime, 402 is the only defense that is
unknown in the civil law world.403 For the defense to be available, the
government's conduct must create the predisposition to commit the
crime. 40 4 Otherwise, when the law enforcement agent merely provides
someone who is already willing and ready to violate the law with the
opportunity to commit a crime, the entrapment defense will not be
available.40 5 Entrapment is aimed strictly at governmental misconduct
and its objective is to prevent the government from manufacturing crime.
The rationale is to protect those who commit a crime at the initiative of
the government, when law enforcement agents implant in their minds the
predisposition to commit a crime, and actively induce its commission.4 6
Responsibility
Common law has developed a fairly sophisticated set of rules
dealing with the defenses excluding blameworthiness.4 7 The most
important one- and the one that has received the most consideration from
authors and the courts- is the insanity defense.40 8 The prevailing test to
determine whether a defendant may be responsible for the act performed
is the M'Naghten right-wrong test which arose in a 19 th century English
400 WELZEL, supra note 93, at 70.
401 Annotation, Entrapment as Defense to Charge of Selling or Supplying
Narcotics Where Government Agents Supplied Narcotics to Defendant and
Purchased them from Him, 9 A.L.R.5th 464 (1993).
402 25 OHIO JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 711 (2000).
403 HENDLER, supra note 7, at 66.
404 15B FLA JUR 2D Criminal Law § 3051 (2001).
405 State v. Dickinson, 370 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1979) ("There is clearly no
constitutional prohibition against a law enforcement officer providing the
opportunity for a person who has the willingness and readiness to break the
law").
406 15B FLAJUR 2D Criminal Law § 3051 (2001).
407 See Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reasoning: Capital
Punishment and the Mentally Retarded Defendant after Penry v. Johnson, 35
AKRON L. REv. 327, 329 (2002) (examining how mental status of the defendant
influences whether the death penalty will be applied)..
408 See 2 TORCIA, supra note 297, at §105 (addressing insanity defense).
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case. 409 This test probes whether, at the time of committing the act, the
accused party was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing, or if he did know, that he did not know that what he was doing
was wrong.410 The M'Naghten test focuses exclusively on cognitive
disability and does not take into account volitional disability.
41'
The Model Penal Code adopted a somewhat different test.
41 2
Under this test, "a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the
time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law., 413 Unlike the
traditional M'Naghten test, the Model Penal Code test does not require
total lack of capacity but substantial lack of capacity.
414
At the federal level, in 1984, the U.S. Congress adopted another
test, which rests heavily on the original M'Naghten test and rejects the
lower standards of the Model Penal Code.415 Under the federal test, the
defendant is not responsible if "as a result of a severe mental disease or
defect, the defendant was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or
the wrongfulness of his acts. 416 In many common law jurisdictions, the
burden of proof of the inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of the act
falls on the defendant.417 In Medina v. California, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that this reverse burden of proof is not unconstitutional.41 8
409 Daniel M'Naghten's Case,8 Eng. Rep. 718, 721 (H.L. 1843).
410 Id.
41 United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 617 (2d Cir. 1966) (applying
"wrongfulness" standard).
412 MPC § 4.01.
413 Id.
414 Id.; United States v. Massa, 804 F.2d 1020, 1022-23 (8th Cir. 1986)
(a4pplying the Model Penal Code insanity test).
415Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 401-06 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 2057., 2057.
416 18 U.S.C.A. § 17(a) (West Supp. 2004).
417 See, e.g., State v Rullo, 412 A2d 1009, 1011 (N.H. 1980) ("the defendant
bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
affirmative defense of insanity"); 21 AM JUR 2d, Criminal Law, § 50 (2004)
(defendant has burden of showing "insanity as defined by law"); Michelle
Migdal Gee, Annotation, Modern Status of Test of Criminal Responsibility-State
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Common law has only recently delved into the temporary mental
defects of intoxication 419  and automatism.4' °  The intoxication
phenomenon, which includes problems caused by alcohol or drugs, has a
different treatment depending on whether the intoxication has been
provoked voluntarily421 or involuntarily.422 The Model Penal Code states
that "if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of
which he would have been had he been sober, such unawareness is
immaterial. 42' 3 However, the courts have admitted that when voluntarily
provoked, intoxication can negate specific intent,424 but not general
* 425intent. Most common law jurisdictions treat involuntary intoxication
as insanity.426 Thus, an involuntarily intoxicated defendant, who "at the
time of his conduct lacks substantial capacity to appreciate its criminality
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law," has a valid
affirmative defense. 27  In general, a defendant is considered
involuntarily intoxicated "when he has become intoxicated through the
fault of another, by accident, inadvertence, or mistake on his own part, or
because of a physiological or psychological condition beyond his
Cases, 9 A.L.R.4th 526, 542-43 (1981) (listing cases where the burden is on the
defendant to show insanity).
418 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 453 (1992).
419 See generally R.W. Gascoyne, Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules as to
Voluntary Intoxication as a Defense to Criminal Charge, 8 A.L.R 3d 1236
(1966); Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Drug Addiction or Related Mental
State as Defense to Criminal Charge, 73 A.L.R 3d 16 (1976).
420 See generally Eunice A. Eichelberger, Annotation, Automatism or
Unconsciousness as Defense to Criminal Charge, 27 A.L.R. 4th 1067 (1984).
421 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04(a) (Vernon 2004) ("Voluntary intoxication
does not constitute a defense to the commission of crime").
422 Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, When Intoxication Deemed Involuntary so
as to Constitute A Defense to Criminal Charge, 73 A.L.R. 3d 195 (1976)
("Generally speaking, an accused may be completely relieved of criminal
responsibility if, because of involuntary intoxication, he was temporarily
rendered legally insane at the time he committed the offense").
423 MPC § 2.08(2).
424 See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 128 (1998) (defining "specific intent").
425 State v. Davis, 612 N.E.2d 343, 347 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (voluntary
intoxication was held to be capable of negating specific intent).
426 See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law §§ 55, 171 (1998) (stating that involuntary
intoxication is a basis for the insanity defense).
427 MPC § 2.08(4).
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control. 428 U.S. courts expressly rejected the doctrine of actio libera in
429 410 as
causa, which has had an ample reception in civil law countries.43°
The automatism defense, which is triggered, for example, as a
consequence of epilepsy attacks, 43 1 negates responsibility when there is a
mental or physical condition that deprives the act of its voluntary
character.432 Defendant is "reliev[ed] [from] criminal responsibility...
because [he] has not engaged in an act... [, i.e.], in a voluntary bodily
movement. 433 The Model Penal Code permits this defense.434 However,
this should not be considered a defense, 435 but instead, as in civil law,
simply an absence of actus reus.
The law of error encompasses "mistake," or "a false conception
of [the object of cognition]", and "ignorance," or "absence of any
perception of the potential object of cognition. 436 The law of error in
common law jurisdictions is not considered a separate defense, but rather
a circumstance that negates the required mental state. The Model Penal
428 Hassman, supra note 422, at 199.
429 Sabens v. United States, 40 App. D.C. 440, 443 (D.C. 1913). "[A] man
who voluntarily puts himself in a condition to have no control of his actions
must be held to intend the consequences. The safety of the community
requires this rule. Intoxication is so easily counterfeited, and when real is so
often resorted to as a means of nerving a person up to the commission of
some desperate act, and is withal so inexcusable in itself, that law has never
recognized it as an excuse for crime.... If the mental status required by law to
constitute crime be one of deliberation and premeditation, and drunkenness or
other cause excludes the existence of such mental state, then the crime is not
excused by drunkenness or such other cause, but has not in fact been
committed." Id.; See J. Perez Diaz, Ponencia del Secretario de Justicia sobre
la Reforma del Codigo Penal De Puerto Rico, 62 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 159, 253
(1993) (discussing "actio libera in causa").
430 See, e.g., Cecilia Sanchez Romero, Jurisprudencia Penal Reciente, 15
CIENCIAS PENALES: REVISTA AsOCIACION DE CIENC1AS PENALES DE COSTA
RICA 98, 100-102 (1998), available at
http://www.cienciaspenales.org/revistal 5f.htm (last accessed October 22, 2004).
431 LAFAVE, supra note 283, at § 4.9.
432 Eichelberger, supra note 420, at 1072.
433 Id.
434 MPC § 2.01(1).
435 Some courts and authors consider it as a defense, even negating mens rea.
See LAFAVE, supra note 283, at §§ 6.1-6.2.
436 2 HELEN SILVING, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 760 (1971).
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Code expressly treats it as a defense, however, which operates when: (i)
"the ignorance or mistake negates the purpose, knowledge, recklessness
or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense": or,
(ii) "the law provides that the state of mind established by the ignorance
or mistake constitutes a defense. 437 The classic example is the case of
"an individual [who takes] a [coat] from a coat rack in a [restaurant]
believing it to be [his] own... [when it actually] belongs to [someone
else]. 438 In this case, there is no larceny because this crime requires a
specific intent of taking another's property; because of the mistake,
intent is not present. The distinction between crimes requiring general
intent 439 and specific intent 440 find little application in the law of error in
common law jurisdictions since the law of error generally applies to
crimes requiring specific intent. In crimes of general intent, the mistake
is a defense only if the mistake is reasonable, and the act was not morally
or legally wrong had the facts been as the defendant believed them to be.
In strict liability offenses, mistake is not a defense. 44' The Model Penal
Code does not require that the mistake be reasonable; the defense may be
successful even if the mistake is considered unreasonable, so long as it
prevents the defendant from having the requisite intent or knowledge.
442
In most jurisdictions, the error defense will not be available when "the
defendant would be guilty of another offense had the situation been as he
supposed.... [However, under the Model Penal Code,] the ignorance or
mistake of the defendant reduces the grade and degree of the offense...
to those of the offense of which he would be guilty had the situation been
as he supposed."" 3
47 MPC § 2.04(1).
438 Elizabeth Phillips Marsh, On Rollercoasters, Submarines, and Judicial
Shipwrecks: Acoustic Separation and the Good Faith Exception to the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 941, 995 (1989).
439 21AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 127 (1998).
440 Id. § 128.
441 See Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797, 804 (Md. 1993). In Garnett, a retarded
man was deemed guilty of statutory rape even though his mistake was
reasonable.




As a general rule, ignorance of the law is not an excuse, so
mistake of law is not considered a defense.444 Ordinarily, knowledge that
the crime exists is not an element of the crime itself and does not negate
the mens rea of the offense. 445 However, in the Model Penal Code, there
are two general exceptions when mistake of law can act as a defense." 6
The first exception is the "reasonable reliance" doctrine.447 This takes
place when the defendant relies on "an official [interpretation] of the law,
now determined to be wrong, contained in [a statute, a judicial decision,
or an administrative order by a public officer responsible] for the
interpretation [, administration,] or enforcement of the law defining the
offense., 448 The second exception is when "the statute... defining the
offense is not known to the actor and has not been published or otherwise
reasonably made available prior to [his] conduct.,
449
V. Crimes Against Life
Common law
Homicide450 is the most salient crime against the person. In some
common law jurisdictions, a distinction is made between culpable and
non-culpable homicides.45  Non-culpable homicides are those that are
justifiable452 or excusable, 453 and thus causing a death is "not
444 Bruce R. Grace, Ignorance of the Law as an Excuse 86 COLUM. L. REV.
1392, 1395 (1986).
445 Id.
446 MPC § 2.04.
447 See Annotation, Criminal Law: "Official Statement" Mistake of Law
Defense, 89 A.L.R. 4th 1026, 1030 (1991) (discussing the "reasonable reliance"
doctrine).
448 Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609, 619 (Mass. 1993).
449 MPC § 2.04(3).
450 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 1 (2004).
451 See R.S.C. Part VIII § 222(2)-(4) (Can.); 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 1
(2004).
452 See 15B FLA JUR 2D Criminal Law § 3424 (2001) ("By statute, a homicide
is justifiable when committed in resistance to an attempt to murder or to commit
any felony on a person").
453 See, e.g., Hopson v. State, 168 So. 810, 811 (Fla. 1936) ("[w]here homicide
is committed by accident or misfortune, the homicide is excusable").
Fall 2005
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
necessarily" unlawful.4 54 These include the execution of a person
sentenced to capital punishment, a soldier's killing of an enemy during
wartime- provided that he respects the jus in bello rules, such as those
contained in the Geneva Conventions455- or a law enforcement agent's
killing of a person in the line of duty.4 56 Culpable homicides have been
characterized as the unlawful causing of the death of another.457 They
include murder and manslaughter. In Canada, there is a third category,
"infanticide," defined as a mother's killing of her "newly-born child,"
either willfully or through omission, when the mother is mentally
disturbed as a result of the birth.458 Some jurisdictions also include the
categories of negligent or vehicular homicide.4 59
Murder
Murder is considered the unlawful killing of a human being
460
with malice aforethought. 461 "Malice ' 462 consists of "an unjustified
454 People v. Mahon, 395 N.E.2d 950, 958 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). See also
Whiteside v. State, 12 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1928) (stating that the
term "homicide" covers both lawful and unlawful acts).
455 See The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
75 U.N.T.S. 31; The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; The Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.S.T. 135; The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.S.T. 287.
456 See 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 1 (2004) ("[The term 'homicide'] does not
necessarily import a crime, since one's act in taking another's life may be
excusable or justifiable").
457 Id.
458 R.S.C. Part VIII § 233 (Can.)..
459 See, e.g., Randy R. Koenders, Annotation, Alcohol-Related Vehicular
Homicide. Nature and Elements of the Offense, 64 A.L.R. 4th 166, 174 (1988)
(discussing alcohol-related vehicular homicide statutes).
46' 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 1 (2004). With respect to the concept of "human
being," common law and civil law courts and authors have debated the criminal
law consequences of taking the life of fetuses and embryos with similar
arguments. See Kayhan Parsi, Metaphorical Imagination: The Moral and Legal
Status of Fetuses and Embryos, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 703 (1999)
(overview of views on fetuses and embryos in law); Keeler v. Superior Ct. of
VOL. 13
CRIMINAL THEORY
disregard for the possibility of death or great bodily harm and an extreme
indifference to the sanctity of human life. 4 63 Despite its name, malice
does not require any special malicious mens rea or even premeditation.
464
Criminal homicides that are committed intentionally, 465  whether
purposely or knowingly; recklessly, manifesting extreme indifference to
the value of human life with a depraved heart; 466 or arising out of the
perpetration of particular felonies, 467 are considered murder. 468 There is
also murder when defendant does not have the intention to kill but to
inflict serious bodily harm, as a result of which death occurs. 46 9 The
Model Penal Code, however, has abandoned this last category as an
independent subcategory of murder, and includes it within the category
of reckless murder.47°
Amador County, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970) (court found that unborn but viable
fetus was not a human being under state statute).
46 40 Am. JUR. 2D Homicide § 37 (2004). Courts continue to use the common
law concept of malice aforethought to define murders. See State v Galloway,
275 NW2d 736, 738 (Iowa 1979) (court states that "malice aforethought is a
necessary element to murder")..
46240 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 37 (2004).
463 State v. Lambert, 705 A.2d 957, 964 (R.I. 1997); State v. McGranahan, 415
A.2d 1298, 1302 (R.I. 1980).
464 DRESSLER, supra note 251, at 503.
465 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2004) (murder in the first degree
requires intent); People v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981, 988 (N.Y. Co.Ct. 1997)
(felony murder statute requires that killing during a felony being intentional).
466 See People v Jefferson, 748 P2d 1223, 1226-27 (Colo. 1988),("depraved-
heart murder... derive[s] from decisions and statutes condemning as murder
unintentional homicide under circumstances evincing a 'depraved mind' or an
abandoned and malignant heart').467 See 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 40 (2004) (felony murder).
468 See also MPC § 210.1 (stating that "[a] person is guilty of criminal homicide
if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of
another human being").
469 See Glenn v. State, 511 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) ("The
critical distinction that needs to be made, however, is between the results
specifically intended, not between the presence or absence of a specific intent...
[T]he inchoate form of intent-to-kill murder is assault with intent to murder,
whereas the inchoate form of intent-to-commit-grievous-bodily-harm murder is
assault with intent to maim, disfigure, or disable").470MPC § 210.1.
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Under intent-to-kill murder, there is an express intent to kill. All
the necessary deliberation is involved in the formation of the purpose to
kill before the perpetration of the fatal act.47' A typical example of this
type of murder is when defendant purposefully shoots a victim, causing
472the victim's death without any justification or excuse.
Another type of murder is that "committed recklessly under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life. 473 A classic illustration of this depraved heart murder is the case of
a workman who drops a brick from the top of a large building to a
crowded street, killing a passerby.47 4 The Model Penal Code provides
that such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor is
engaged as the perpetrator or participant of a "robbery, rape or deviate
sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary,
kidnapping, or felonious escape.,
475
There are common law jurisdictions that consider a crime those
homicides committed in the perpetration of all or certain specified
felonies.476 Here, defendant does not intend to cause death,4 7 which may
be casual and unintentional. 478 The law supplies or presumes intent to kill
471 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 39 (2004).
472 See Cupps v. State, 97 N.W. 210, 213-214 (Wis. 1903) (stating that "under
our statute every intentional taking of human life not excusable or justifiable is
murder in the first degree").
173 Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Extreme
Indifference Murder Statute, 7 A.L.R.5th 758, 772 (1992).
474 LAFAVE, supra note 283, at § 14.4(a). Other examples, as illustrated by
LaFave, are: "firing a bullet into a room occupied, as the defendant knows, by
several people; starting a fire at the front door of an occupied dwelling; shooting
into the caboose of a passing train or into a moving automobile, necessarily
occupied by human beings; throwing a beer glass at one who is carrying a
lighted oil lamp; playing a game of "Russian roulette" with another person;
shooting at a point near, but not aiming directly at, another person; driving a car
at very high speeds along a main street; shaking an infant so long and so
vigorously that it cannot breathe; selling 'pure' (i.e., undiluted) heroin," Id.
47 MPC § 210.2(1)(b).
476 40 AM JUR 2D Homicide § 40 (2004) (felony murder).
477 See Adams v. State, 341 So. 2d 765, 767-768 (Fla. 1976) ("Even an
accidental killing during a felony is murder").
478 See Frady v. People, 40 P.2d 606, 608 (Colo. 1934) (stating that "malice,
deliberation, premeditation and intent" do not need to be proven in felony
murder); Stansbury v. State, 146 A.2d 17, 20 (Md. 1958) (the fact that a weapon
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by attaching the intent to commit the other felony to the homicide.479
Despite ample criticism against the felony murder rule,48° the United
States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of felony murder
statutes in presuming intent.48 Thus, it becomes essential to prove the
existence of a direct causal link between the homicide and the
commission of the other felony.482 For example, if defendant committed
arson, 483 and a firefighter died in the resulting fire, because the homicide
resulted from defendant's act of arson, and the homicide was an ordinary
and probable effect of the felony, there is felony murder whether the
death was intended or not.484
Intent to cause grievous bodily harm which results in death
requires: "the intent to inflict the wound which produces a homicide,,
485
and a finding that the defendant "knew or should have known that his
acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. 486 For
was used in a robbery was enough to support murder, even if defendant did not
intend to discharge weapon); State v. Glover, 50 S.W.2d 1049, 1053 (Mo. 1932)
(defendant should reasonably foresee death where his felony is "dangerous and
betokens a reckless disregard of human life").
419 See Stansbury, 146 A.2d at 20; State v. King, 68 P. 418, 420 (Utah 1902)
("the implied malice involved in the felonious intent to rob being... sufficient to
establish the malicious intent").
480 See People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 783,(Cal. 1965) (noting several
treatises, articles, and cases criticizing the felony murder rule).
481 Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88,101 (1998) (holding that Nebraska's felony
murder law presuming intent was constitutional).
482 See Jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d 262, 269 (Del. 1967) (stating that "the felony
murder rule.., should be limited to homicides proximately caused by the
perpetrator or attempted perpetration of felonies which are... foreseeably
dangerous to human life").
483 See U.S. v. Tham, 118 F.3d 1501, 1508 (11th Cir. 1997) (malice in
committing arson supplies malice for felony murder); People v. Chavez, 329
P.2d 907, 914 (Cal. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946, (1959),cert. denied, 359
U.S. 993 (1959) (felony murder where defendants committed arson and knew
people were inside building) .
484 See Glover, 50 S.W.2d at 1052,
485 State v. McNeill, 485 S.E.2d 284, 287 (N.C. 1997).
486 State v. Baca, 950 P.2d 776, 784 (N.M. 1997) (second degree murder
becomes first degree "when the murder is committed in the course of a
dangerous felony").
Fall 2005
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
example, in State v. McNeil487 defendant took a knife to the victim's
apartment to "scare off' a man he believed was there "so he could talk to
the victim alone." When defendant entered the apartment, "he and the
victim began arguing and shoving one another;" then, defendant "stabbed
her in the chest, back, arms, abdomen, and breast before [he was
restrained from] wounding the victim further," but she died after several
hours.488
As can be appreciated from this classification, the common law
concept of murder equates to all cases of willful homicide, whether
aggravated or simple, in civil law. 489 For example, intent-to-kill murder
corresponds to direct willful homicide, and depraved heart murder, as
well as murders where defendant's intent is to seriously cause bodily
injury, coincides with eventual willful homicide.
490
In some jurisdictions, murder is divided into degrees according
to its gravity and seriousness. 491 The most common divisions are first
and second degree.492  In general, first degree murder includes
premeditated493 and deliberate 494 murder. Premeditation is "a fully
formed conscious purpose to kill that may be formed in a moment and
need only exist for such time as will allow the accused to be conscious of
the nature of the act he is about to commit and the probable result of that
act., 495 Similarly, "deliberation requires that the defendant considered the
487 McNeill, 485 S.E.2d 284 at 286.
488 Id.
489 HENDLER, supra note 7, at 142. However, as clearly put forward by Hendler,
not all these cases have an exact correspondence in civil law.
490 Id.
4" See 35 N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law §§ 3783, 3787 (2004) (first and second
degree murder).
492 See Id.
493 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 133 (2004) (premeditation). See also, e.g.,
State v. Ruff, 492 S.E.2d 374, 376 (N.C.App. 1997), rev'd on other grounds,
505 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1998) (premeditation is a factor that trial court may
consider in evaluating an offense).
494 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 133 (2004) (deliberation). See also, e.g.,
People v. Osband, 919 P.2d 640, 688 (Cal. 1996) ("We have defined 'deliberate'
as "formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and
weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action").
495 Kirkland v. State, 684 So. 2d 732, 734 (Fla. 1996).
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probable consequences of his act before doing the act. 4 9 6 Additionally,
felony murders, or crimes committed in the course of certain enumerated
and highly dangerous felonies, such as "arson, burglary, kidnapping, rape
[and] robbery," are also considered first degree.497 Second degree
murders include murders committed with an intent to cause serious
bodily injury, killings resulting from "outrageously reckless" conduct
(depraved heart), and felony murders that are not considered first degree
murders. 498 This classification of -i first and second degree murder
generally coincides with the civil law distinctions of aggravated (first
degree) and simple (second degree) homicides.499
Manslaughter
As opposed to murder, manslaughter can be conceptualized as
the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought, or
premeditation.500 Manslaughter has traditionally been classified as
voluntary or involuntary. ° Voluntary manslaughter includes killings in
the heat of passion.0 2 This crime originated the belief that killing on the
spur of the moment5 03- such as when a person killed another in a village
brawl, or a husband who found his wife in bed with another man and
killed either or both of them- was less blameworthy than killing with
504malice aforethought, with premeditation and deliberation. ° It was
496 State v. Marks, 537 N.W.2d 339, 343 (Neb. 1995),
49' ARNOLD H. LOEWY, CRIMINAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 46 (4th ed. 2003).
498 Id. at 33, 44-45
4 99 HENDLER,supra note 7, at 143.
500 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide §§ 54, 60,-61 (2004)
501 See 18 TEX. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 194 (2004). "Although [in some
jurisdictions, this] distinction.., is no longer applicable under statutory law," the
courts continue to use these concepts to "differentiate between [the different
types of] manslaughter," id..
502 See Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 42-43 (D.C. 1990) ("[v]oluntary
manslaughter is an intentional killing in the heat of passion as the result of sever
provocation").
503 See Joshua Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a
Rationale, 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 421, 426 (1982) ("[b]y the sixteenth
century in England... intentional killings as a result of drunken brawls and
breaches of honor had become all too common").
504 See Glenn, 511 A.2d at 1114, 1122-1123. The court discusses the rise of the
distinction between murder and manslaughter in common law.
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believed that in these cases, defendant did not deserve capital
punishment,50 5 which was the prevalent punishment in the United
Kingdom for centuries. °6 Consequently, the courts carved out the
manslaughter crime for those cases in which the defendant was provoked
and thus killed in the heat of passion before he "cooled off.
507
Provocation, in order to be adequate, must be such as might naturally
cause a reasonable person in the passion of the moment to lose self-
508control and act on impulse without reflection. A two-tiered test has
been created with which courts analyze: (i) whether the wrongful act was
of sufficient nature to deprive an ordinary person of self-control,0 9 and
(ii) whether the provoked person acted all of a sudden before his or her
passion had time to cool off.5 °
Involuntary manslaughter may be caused by reckless conduct,
511
such as when a person is aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk and
505 See Holmes v. D.P.P., 2 All E.R. 124, 128 (H.L. 1946) ("the reason why the
problem of drawing the line between murder and manslaughter, where there has
been provocation, is so difficult and so important, is because the sentence for
murder is fixed and automatic"); Regina v. Cunningham, 1 Q.B. 288 (Crim App.
1958) (stating that "provocation may reduce murder to manslaughter");
Ashworth, Sentencing in Provocation Cases, 1975 CRIM. L.R. 553, 553 (1975)
("[m]urder is the only crime to which provocation may afford a defence, and this
is traditionally justified by reference to the fixed penalty for murder"); Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953 Report (1953), [Cmd. 8932], at
para. 144 (addressing the provocation defense as "an attempt to reconcile the
preservation of the fixed penalty for murder with a limited concession to natural
human weakness").
506 See Glenn, 511 A.2d at 1123 ("[a]ll murder had become theoretically
unmitigated and, therefore, capital").
507 DRESSLER, supra note 251, at 529.
508 See Comber, 584 A.2d at 42-43 ("an intentional killing committed in 'sudden
heat of passion' as the result of adequate provocation constitutes voluntary
manslaughter").
509 State v. King, 181 A.2d 158, 166 (N.J. 1962). See also Griffin v. State, 644
N.E.2d 561, 562 (Ind. 1994) (there must be "appreciable evidence of sudden
heat" for a voluntary manslaughter jury instruction).
510 King, 181 A.2d at 166.
511 See Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195, 212 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), affd,
490 U.S. 754 (1989) ("[o]ne of the ways that.., involuntary manslaughter might
be committed is if the defendant recklessly causes the death of another
individual"); Mendez v. State, 575 S.W.2d 36, 37-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)
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chooses to take it anyway.512 An example of this type of manslaughter
would be a pharmacist that sells an expired medicine trusting that it will
serve its purpose and will not cause the death of the patient, when in fact,
it does. Additionally, involuntary manslaughter may take place when a
person acts with a grossly negligent conduct. 13 This would be the case in
the above example if the pharmacist gave the patient the expired
medicine without even looking at the expiration date. Involuntary
manslaughter may also occur in the course of the commission of certain
offenses,5 14 such as when a person procured an illicit drug for herself,
and another person who consumes it with her dies of an overdose. 15
Civil law
In civil law jurisdictions, modem criminal codes generally
contain two parts. The first part delineates the general aspects of the
theory of the offense, as well as sentencing principles and crime
participation. The second part, called "special part," or lex specialis,
contains the definitional terms and sentencing penalties for each crime.
5 16
Unlike common law, the definitions of crimes in the special part of the
codes are quite abstract, and formulated in somewhat more vague terms.
The premise behind this lies in the belief that the general theory of
offense should suffice to explain all vicissitudes of each particular crime.
("[t]he gist of our involuntary manslaughter offense is reckless conduct"); Dillon
v. State, 574 S.W.2d 92, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) ("[t]he culpable mental state
for involuntary manslaughter is to recklessly cause the death of an individual").
512 See DRESSLER, supra note 251, at 541 (if risk-taking was "not extreme
enough to merit treatment as murder").
513 See 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 61 (2004) (there must be "absence of the
intention to cause death").
514 See 25 AM. JUR. 2D Drugs And Controlled Substances § 144 (2004) (stating
that the "furnishing of.. drugs" where there is a death is best supported by
manslaughter).
515 See People v Meyer, 208 NW2d 230, 235 (Mich.Ct.App. 1973) (holding
defendant committed manslaughter by providing heroin in "reckless disregard
for the safety of others"); State v Randolph, 676 S.W.2d 943, 947 (Tenn. 1984)
(courts finds involuntary manslaughter or second degree murder could be found
where defendant provides drugs to another who then dies).
516 The Italian Criminal Code contains a third part dealing with misdemeanors
and contraventions, as does the Swiss Criminal Code, which refers to
competence, jurisdiction, and other applicability issues.
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In the civil law world, there is usually only one general category
of crime against life, namely, homicide (also referred to as simple
homicide). Most civil law jurisdictions recognize three subcategories of
homicide: simple homicide, 17 aggravated homicide, 58 and negligent
homicide. 19 Simple homicide is defined as killing another human
being.520 It is a general category that encompasses all homicides
committed willfully with both direct and eventual dolus, unless they fit
into one of the special subcategories.
Aggravated homicide is the killing of a human being where there
exist special circumstances that render the crime more inhumane and
cruel. These circumstances vary in different jurisdictions. In Spain, for
example, some of these aggravating circumstances are: malice; the
receipt of a price, reward or other promise; and brutality in order to
increase the victim's suffering.521 In Italy and Argentina, among other
states, the criminal code also includes the existence of a family link as an
aggravating circumstance. Thus, the homicide of a parent, grandparent,
child, grandchild or spouse turns simple homicide into aggravated
homicide.522 In Argentina, another aggravating circumstance is killing
due to racial or religious hate.52 3 Interestingly, in France, the profession
of the victim may be an aggravating factor- such as the case of judges,
lawyers, jurors, public officers, military and police officers.524 In a small
minority of civil law jurisdictions, there is a general category of
aggravated homicides that more closely resembles the common law
concept of murder and malice aforethought. These jurisdictions include
Germany, which considers a murderer "whoever kills a human being out
of murderous lust, to satisfy his sexual desires, from greed or otherwise
517 See C.P. art.138 (Spain) (simple homicide is referred to as murder); COD.
PEN. art. 79 (Arg.); C. PEN. art. 221-1 (Fr.); C.P. art. 575 (Italy) (where simple
homicide is merely called homicide).
511 See C.P. art. 139 (Spain); C. PEN art. 221-2 (Fr.); COD. PEN. art. 80 (Arg.);
C.P. art. 576 (Italy).
519 See C.P. art. 142 (Spain); C. PEN. art. 221-3 (Fr.); C6D. PEN. art. 84 (Arg.);
C.P. art. 589 (Italy).
520 See C.P. art. 138 (Spain); C. PEN. art. 221-1 (Fr.); COD. PEN. art. 70 (Arg.);
C.P. art. 575 (Italy).
521 See C.P. art. 139 (Spain).
52 COD. PEN. art. 80 (Arg.); C.P. art. 576 (Italy)..
523 C6D. PEN. art. 80 (Arg.).
524 C. PtN. art. 221-4 (Fr.)..
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base motives, treacherously or cruelly or with means dangerous to the
public or in order to make another crime possible or cover it up; ' 525 and
Switzerland, whose criminal code conceptualizes murder as different
from simple homicide, when the defendant acted without scruples, with
malice, and in a perverse fashion.52 6 Negligent homicide is generally
defined as causing the death of another human being due to
imprudence,5 27 negligence, 528 inattention, 529 or non-observance of rules
or a professional standard 3°
Some jurisdictions also contemplate another subcategory for
crimes committed under mitigating circumstances. One such subcategory
is unpremeditated ("preterintentional") homicide, which takes place
when greater harm than that intended or planned occurs. In the Italian
Criminal Code, criminal liability is attached to anyone who, with the
intention of committing certain grave crimes, causes the death of a
human being.5 31 The unpremeditated homicide usually carries a sentence
that is lower than that foreseen for simple homicide.
In some jurisdictions, the codes contemplate the crime of
passionate homicide, which carries a reduced sentence, and applies to
those cases where the defendant killed as a consequence of a violent
mood commotion.3 This resembles voluntary manslaughter committed
in the heat of passion.533 Other civil law jurisdictions have adopted
mitigating factors, i.e., situations where the penalty for simple homicide
is reduced due to the existence of special circumstances. These
525 § 211 Nr. 2 StGB (F.R.G.).
526 SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] art. 112 (Switz.).
527 See C.P. art. 142 (Spain).
528 See C.P. art. 589 (Italy); COD. PEN. art. 84 (Arg.).
529 See C. PEN. art. 221-6 (Fr.).
530 See Id.; COD. PEN. art. 84 (Arg.).
531 C.P. art. 584 (Italy).
532 See STGB art. 113 (Switz.); § 213 StGB (F.R.G) ("If the person committing
manslaughter was provoked to rage by maltreatment inflicted on him or a
relative or a serious insult by the person killed and was thereby immediately torn
to commit the act, or in the event of an otherwise less serious case, the
punishment shall be imprisonment from one year to ten years").
131 See MPC § 210.3(1)(b) (manslaughter is homicide committed "under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is
reasonable explanation or excuse").
Fall 2005
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
mitigating factors generally include a violent state of emotion,534 which
again can be equated to the common law form of manslaughter
committed in the heat of passion. As in common law, some jurisdictions
also expressly include the crimes of infanticide53 5 and motor vehicular
homicide5 3 6 as separate crimes.
Some criminal law comparativists, perhaps betrayed by the
apparent similarities, particularly in terminology, have held that simple
homicide can be equated with manslaughter and that murder compares to
the civil law concept of murder adopted in Spain or, aggravated
homicide, as adopted in Italy, France or Argentina, to name but a few.53 7
In actuality, murder in common law jurisdictions encompasses all cases
of civil law willful homicide, whether simple or aggravated. Although
U.S. precedents and doctrine refer to certain situations that do not always
find an exact correlation in civil .law, both systems have normally given
reasonably similar solutions. 538 For example, intent-to-kill murder shares
many similarities with direct dolus, and intent to cause serious bodily
harm murder -despite superficially appearing to correspond to
unpremeditated homicide- actually equates to homicide committed with
eventual dolus.
539
Similarly, voluntary manslaughter committed in the heat of
passion equates to civil law's homicide committed in a violent state of
emotion, as contemplated in the criminal codes of Switzerland and
Argentina, among others.54 ° Involuntary manslaughter committed by a
negligent act, referred to by the Model Penal Code as negligent
homicide, can be equated to civil law's negligent homicide. When
involuntary manslaughter is caused by a reckless act, its counterparts in
534 See, e.g., COD. PEN. art. 81 (Arg.).
535 See, e.g., STGB art. 116 (Switz).
536 See, e.g., C.P. art. 152 (Spain).
537 See Barney Sneiderman, PERSPECTIVES ON THE LATIMER TRIAL:
Latimer in the Supreme Court: Necessity, Compassionate Homicide, and
Mandatory Sentencing, 64 SASK. L. REv. 511, 535 (2001) (noting that many
civil law countries apply a lesser degree of homicide depending on the motive
for the killing).
538 See HENDLER, supra note 7, at 148.
539 See id. at 149.
540 STGB art. 113 (Switz.) ; CoD. PEN. art. 81 (Arg.).
VOL. 13
CRIMINAL THEORY
civil law are homicides committed with eventual dolus and conscious
negligence. 541
Conclusions
Common law and civil law have been traditionally seen as
distinctive and fairly diverse. Each belongs to a tradition that has been
regarded as quite different. However, in several areas, common law and
civil law have been increasingly moving toward natural convergence.
This process toward convergence does not mean that civil law and
common law are one and the same. On the contrary, as demonstrated,
there are still important differences in virtually every area of law in these
two systems. However, these differences derive from a different order of
priority in sources, a different style of judicial decisions and doctrinal
analysis, and a slightly different interpretation method.
Civil law tends to proclaim sets of principles of general and
more abstract applicability to govern most areas of offense. In contrast,
in common law jurisdictions there is a tendency to articulate rules of
more precise and specific applicability through the courts' adjudication
functions.
In the present stage of development toward convergence in the
theory of offense, common law and civil law have arrived at practically
analogous solutions in the vast majority of criminal law problems,
despite differences in style, methodology and terminology. For example,
the conception of actus reus resembles the more elaborate notion of act.
Civil law, especially through the lens of the Goal-oriented school, places
more emphasis on the voluntary nature of the act than common law.
However, in practice, the situations where an act exists -and therefore,
the cases of inexistence of an act- are essentially the same in both
common law and civil law. Similarly, the four mental states of common
law find acceptable equivalents in civil law for most crimes. Also, in the
area of defenses and justifications, despite certain differences in their
treatment, are very similar -with the sole exception of entrapment- in
both civil law and common law. Additionally, the conception of crimes
against life and the criminal law solutions adopted - albeit clothed in
different terminology are very similar in civil law and common law. For
example, murder in common law jurisdictions encompasses all cases of
civil law willful homicide, whether simple or aggravated. Similarly,
541 See HENDLER, supra note 7, at 149.
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intent-to-kill murder shares many similarities with direct dolus, and the
intent to cause serious bodily harm murder equates to homicide
committed with eventual dolus. Likewise, voluntary manslaughter
committed in the heat of passion equates to civil law's homicide
committed in a violent state of emotion; involuntary manslaughter
committed by a negligent act can be equated to civil law's negligent
homicide; and, involuntary manslaughter caused by a reckless act finds
its civil law counterpart in homicides committed with eventual dolus and
conscious negligence.
The reasons for the similarity in treatment, structure, and
analysis between civil law and common law offense theory and practice
are twofold. First, common law and civil law present common features: a
highly compatible nature derived from their common Western
philosophy and secular objectives, and a history of evolution toward
convergence. Second, common law and civil law jurisdictions generally
pursue similar criminal justice objectives, which translate into related
criminal law solutions and instruments.
